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Chapter 1
Crisis, Coordination, and Contagion
This chapter explores how private information acquisition affects the probability of a fi-
nancial crisis. I study a global coordination game of regime change in which a crisis
occurs if a sufficient number of creditors run on a bank or do not roll over debt to a
sovereign. Creditors receive noisy private information about the solvency of the bank or
sovereign and choose ex-ante whether to improve the quality of their information at a
cost. Learning adverse public news about the solvency of the bank or sovereign increases
strategic uncertainty among creditors. This induces a creditor to acquire private informa-
tion to align his decision with that of other creditors. Since informed creditors are more
likely to withdraw or refuse to roll over, information acquisition amplifies the probabil-
ity of a financial crisis. Further extending the study to include news about another bank
(Lehman) or sovereign (Greece), I demonstrate that the acquisition of private information
makes bank runs systemic or sovereign debt crises contagious.
JEL Classifications: C7, D8, F3, G01, G21
Keywords: ampliﬁcation, contagion, ﬁnancial crisis, information acquisition
I am grateful to Christian Hellwig, John Moore, and Francesco Nava for comments
and fruitful discussions. I thank seminar participants at Amsterdam (UvA), Bank of
Canada, Bank of England, University of Bonn , Bowdoin, Bundesbank, Haskayne School
of Business, Cleveland Fed, De Nederlandsche Bank, Federal Reserve Board of Governors,
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1.1 Introduction
Financial crises, such as systemic bank runs and sovereign debt crises, have substantial
ﬁnancial and economic costs.1 A self-fulﬁlling ﬁnancial crisis can be caused by the coordi-
nation failure of bank creditors or sovereign debt holders. In Diamond and Dybvig (1983),
for example, the fear of premature withdrawal by other depositors induces a given deposi-
tor to withdraw prematurely, causing a bank run.2 Pioneered by Carlsson and van Damme
(1993), the global games literature establishes a unique equilibrium in coordination prob-
lems if the exogenous private information about the proﬁtability of a bank, or the solvency
of a debtor, is suﬃciently precise.3 While information is exogenous in this literature, a
large part of advanced economies is devoted to the generation, collection, and processing
of information (Veldkamp (2011)). This holds particularly for the ﬁnancial industry and
suggests a role for endogenous information.
This paper examines the consequences of private information acquisition on ﬁnancial
crises, such as bank runs or sovereign debt crises. I study a coordination game of regime
change in which a crisis occurs if a suﬃcient number of creditors withdraw from a bank or
do not roll over debt to a sovereign. Before making their decision, creditors receive noisy
private information about the solvency of the bank or sovereign. This information can
be made more precise ex-ante at a cost, for example by hiring analysts or by purchasing
data and IT infrastructure. More precise information helps a creditor align his decision
with that of other creditors. In short, information supports coordination.
This paper addresses three questions. First, I examine how changes in economic
fundamentals aﬀect incentives to acquire private information and consequently the prob-
ability of a ﬁnancial crisis. For instance, how do disappointing Spanish unemployment
ﬁgures alter the incentives of Spanish debt holders to gather information and, in turn, to
roll over debt? Second, I study the strategic aspects of information acquisition. For ex-
ample, in case of an investor in US municipal debt, how does the decision to ﬁnd out more
1In a survey of banking crises in the member countries of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS) from 1985 to 2009, BCBS (2010a) find the median cost of banking crises to be 9% of pre-crisis
GDP.
2This argument extends to the coordination problem associated with the roll-over decision of debt
holders (Morris and Shin (2004)) and the attacking decision of currency speculators (Obstfeld (1986)).
3The unique equilibrium features a run on solvent but illiquid banks in Rochet and Vives (2004) or
Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) and the refusal to roll over debt to solvent debtors in Morris and Shin
(2004).
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about the municipality’s health depend on the amount of information gathering by other
investors? Third, I analyze whether public information spillovers about another bank or
sovereign cause contagion via their eﬀect on information acquisition. For example, how
does a debt restructuring in Greece aﬀect Italian debt holders and their incentives to
acquire information?
My main contribution is to demonstrate that the endogenous acquisition of private
information after adverse public news increases the probability of a ﬁnancial crisis. To
illustrate this ampliﬁcation eﬀect, I focus on the case of a sovereign debt crisis, but the
argument is also applicable to a bank run. Suppose that a sovereign’s ability to repay
its debt is high due to its taxation power or multinational support.4 Adverse news has
two eﬀects on the probability of a crisis. First, it directly raises the probability of a crisis
via a learning eﬀect. If the sovereign is commonly perceived to be less solvent, a debt
crisis can be triggered by fewer debt holders who do not roll over, and the probability
of a crisis is increased. Second, adverse news changes the incentives for debt holders to
acquire information. The eﬀect information acquisition has on the probability of a crisis
constitutes a novel ampliﬁcation eﬀect and is explained in detail below.
News about higher unemployment rates or higher borrowing costs increases uncer-
tainty about whether there will be a sovereign debt crisis and, consequently, strategic
uncertainty. A debt holder initially expects the sovereign to be in good ﬁscal condition
such that a debt crisis is unlikely, and he expects few other debt holders not to roll over.
After adverse news, however, a sovereign debt crisis is more likely and the actions of
other debt holders more uncertain. Therefore, information about the sovereign’s health
becomes more valuable, as it helps a debt holder align his roll over decision with that of
other debt holders. Since information supports coordination, a debt holder has a greater
incentive to acquire information and more debt holders become informed.
Given the supposed high solvency of the sovereign, a larger proportion of informed
debt holders leads to a higher probability of a crisis (lemma 1). Uninformed debt holders,
4As shown in the main text in section (1.4), the amplification effect after adverse news holds generally.
Thus, the focus on strong fundamentals of the sovereign, arguably the empirically relevant case, is
expositional. If fundamentals were weak, then adverse news reduces strategic uncertainty. Therefore,
the incentives to acquire information is reduced, since there is less need for coordination with other
investors. Fewer investors acquire information in equilibrium. This still increases the probability of a
crisis since, conditional on adverse fundamentals, informed investors are more likely to roll over debt to
the sovereign. Taken together, adverse information is amplified via the information acquisition choice of
investors.
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who have imprecise private information, only refrain from rolling over debt if their private
information is very negative. By contrast, informed debt holders, who have precise private
information, already refrain from rolling over if their information is mildly negative for
two reasons: ﬁrst, informed debt holders rely more on their private information as it is
more precise; and second, they expect a larger proportion of informed debt holders to
refrain from rolling over. Therefore, an informed debt holder rolls over less often than an
uninformed debt holder for both fundamental and strategic reasons. Taken together, the
acquisition of private information after adverse public news ampliﬁes the probability of
a sovereign debt crisis.
My second contribution is to show the existence of a novel contagion eﬀect, based
on the acquisition of private information, that makes bank runs systemic or sovereign
debt crises contagious (proposition 3). I consider an extension that includes public infor-
mation spillovers, such as news about another bank (the default of Lehman) or another
sovereign (debt restructuring in Greece). This aﬀects bank creditors or sovereign debt
holders elsewhere, since the proﬁtability of banks or the solvency of sovereigns is posi-
tively correlated across regions. Such positive correlation arises from asset commonality,
since several banks invested in asset-backed securities or trade, ﬁnancial, or political
links between sovereigns. When the ampliﬁcation eﬀect is applied to a scenario with the
spillover of public information, adverse news about another region changes the incentives
to acquire information about the present region, increasing the probability of a ﬁnancial
crisis. Adverse news about Greek sovereign debt, for example, triggers sovereign debt
holders of other peripheral European countries to acquire private information about their
exposure, increasing the probability of a sovereign debt crisis on these countries. This
novel contagion eﬀect can lead to strong spillovers between loosely connected countries.
There is also a small technical contribution. The coordination motive between bank
creditors or sovereign debt holders at the roll-over coordination stage translates into a co-
ordination motive in information acquisition choices (lemma 2). Therefore, the incentive
to acquire information increases in the proportion of investors who acquire information.
Consequently, there are multiple equilibria for an interim value of the information cost
(proposition 1). Section 1.1.1 places this result in the context of the closely related lit-
erature on multiple equilibria in other coordination games with endogenous information
studied previously.
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While the focus of the present paper is on bank runs and sovereign debt crises,
the novel ampliﬁcation and contagion eﬀects apply more broadly. Coordination games
of regime change have been used extensively to study a range of social and economic
phenomena, including models of political regime change. Upon observing a revolution in
a neighboring country, citizens acquire information about the strength of their political
regime that enables them to coordinate their attempts at revolution (such as in the Arab
spring).5 Another application is in investment complementarity, for instance in foreign
direct investment.6 Adverse news about the macroeconomic fundamentals in the country
to be invested in results in foreign direct investors to seek additional information sources
to evaluate their investment prospects.
The remainder of this paper is presented as follows. Section 1.1.1 discusses related
literature. Section 1.2 describes the model and section 1.3 analyzes its equilibrium. I
present the main result of how the acquisition of private information ampliﬁes the prob-
ability of a ﬁnancial crisis in section 1.4. An extension that includes news about a crisis
elsewhere is analyzed in section 1.5, and it demonstrates how the acquisition of private
information makes a bank run systemic and a sovereign debt crisis contagious. An exten-
sion with dispersed costs of becoming informed is considered in section 1.6, which further
strengthens the ampliﬁcation and contagion results. Conclusions are presented in section
1.7, while derivations and proofs can be found in the Appendix (1.8).
1.1.1 Literature
There exists a large literature on contagion. Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) consider a
global coordination game with risk-averse speculators invested in two regions. After a
crisis in the ﬁrst region, speculators become more averse to strategic uncertainty and thus
5Edmond (2012) studies a coordination game of political regime change with endogenous information
manipulation (propaganda) and demonstrates the existence of a unique equilibrium. Circumstances are
analyzed under which an information revolution, such as the availability of social media that make both
private information more precise and more sources of information available, results in a higher probability
of political regime change. In contrast, the present paper considers information acquisition and examines
the effect on deteriorating fundamentals on incentives to become informed, which lies at the heart of the
proposed amplification and contagion mechanisms.
6Dasgupta (2007) studies the effects of an option to delay an investment decision. Delay reduces
the payoff from investment, since the best projects are already taken by competitors, but which allows
agents to use more accurate information. By contrast, here I consider the effects on incentives to acquire
information and the consequences in terms of the amplification of a financial crisis and contagion. See
also Chamley (1999).
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withdraw their funds from the second region, which is a wealth eﬀect. In contrast, the
contagion mechanism proposed in this paper arises from changes in information acquisi-
tion choices by risk-neutral agents after adverse news about the ﬁrst region, providing a
fully complementary contagion mechanism. Studying interbank linkages, Allen and Gale
(2000) provide a model of ﬁnancial contagion as an equilibrium outcome. Dasgupta (2004)
demonstrates that ﬁnancial contagion occurs with positive probability in the unique equi-
librium of a global game extension of the model proposed by Allen and Gale (2000), fo-
cusing on the coordination failure initiated by adverse information. Ahnert and Georg
(WP) analyze the eﬀect of ex-post interbank contagion on a bank’s ex-ante portfolio
choice and study the consequences for systemic risk.7 In contrast to these papers, I
demonstrate that endogenous acquisition of private information after adverse news about
another bank increases the probability of a bank run, constituting a novel contagion
channel.8
Within the global games literature pioneered by Carlsson and van Damme (1993),
and further developed by Morris and Shin (2003) and Frankel et al. (2003), Colombo et al.
(WP) study the eﬃciency of endogenous acquisition of private information in a general
setting. In an inﬂuential paper, Morris and Shin (2002) show that more transparency
can be detrimental to welfare, initiating a debate on the social value of public informa-
tion. Revisiting this result, Colombo et al. (WP) demonstrate that the social value of
public information is higher when there is private information acquisition, since the pro-
vision of public information crowds out private information acquisition.9 In contrast, I
analyze how changes in the endogenous acquisition of private information ampliﬁes the
probability of a crisis.
7Systemic risk due common exposures is considered in Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008b), who show
that banks can have an ex-ante incentive to correlate their investment decision to avoid information con-
tagion. Allen et al. (2012) analyze systemic risk resulting from the interaction of common exposures and
funding maturity through an information channel. Asset commonality can lead to fire sales, and there is
a large literature on contagion through such a pecuniary externality which builds on Shleifer and Vishny
(1992).
8A complementary contagion mechanism arises in Ahnert and Bertsch (WP), where agents observe a
crisis elsewhere, but are uncertain about their region’s exposure to it. Surprisingly, there can be contagion
after good news: the probability of a crisis increases after agents learn that there is zero exposure to the
crisis region. By contrast, the ex-post interdependence between regions is non-stochastic and non-zero
in my model, and I study how the acquisition choice of private information about regional fundamentals
amplifies and spreads banking and sovereign debt crises.
9A related paper is Szkup and Trevino (WP) who also analyze the social value of public information
in a setting with endogenous private information acquisition similar to the present paper. However, their
work is not concerned with the amplification and contagion mechanisms at the heart of this work.
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Recent studies analyze the multiplicity of equilibria in coordination games with
endogenous information. My model features strategic complementarity in private infor-
mation acquisition (lemma 2) that leads to multiple equilibria in information acquisition
(proposition 1). This complements the closely related result of Hellwig and Veldkamp
(2009), who obtain multiple equilibria in a beauty contest coordination game with a
binary information choice. Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) discuss the similarity in the
strategic motives between choosing an action and deciding on how much information to
acquire in a beauty-contest model. In their words, investors “who want to do what others
do, want to know what others know” (p. 223). They also demonstrate that endogenous
acquisition of public information gives rise to multiplicity, while uniqueness is obtained
with endogenous acquisition of private information. Angeletos and Werning (2006) show
that the aggregation of dispersed private information into a publicly observed market
price, similar to Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), reestablishes multiplicity of equilibrium
- even in global coordination games.10 Angeletos et al. (2006) and Angeletos and Pavan
(WP) examine how the endogenous public information from a policy intervention gener-
ates multiple equilibria. By contrast, Zwart (2007) studies the signaling eﬀect of an IMF
intervention and obtains a unique equilibrium.
Some recent papers investigate the eﬀect of information acquisition on bank runs.
Introducing insolvent banks into a Diamond and Dybvig (1983) setup, Nikitin and Smith
(2008) study the eﬀects of costly veriﬁcation of a bank’s solvency. A partial bank run
occurs for interim veriﬁcation costs, where investors become informed and run on in-
solvent banks only. This is in contrast to the present paper, which studies how news
about bank solvency aﬀects the incentives of investors to become informed, and the sub-
sequent repercussions on the probability of a bank run.11 He and Manela (WP) show
that information acquisition after adverse news about a bank’s liquidity leads to a run on
solvent but illiquid banks. The authors also study how a stress test – a public provision
of information about bank solvency – curbs private incentives to acquire information and
thus prevents bank runs. The baseline model in the present paper shares the feature of
multiple equilibria in information acquisition, but diﬀers in terms of the focus on the co-
ordination aspect of bank runs. That is, a larger proportion of informed agents increases
10See also Hellwig et al. (2006) and Ozdenoren and Yuan (2008).
11Furthermore, there are a multiple equilibria without information acquisition in Nikitin and Smith
(2008), while in my model the equilibrium is unique without information acquisition.
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or decreases the probability of a bank run (lemma 1), depending on the strength of the
bank’s fundamental relative to the strategic eﬀect from coordination.
1.2 Model
The economy is inhabited by a unit continuum of agents indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Agents
play a coordination game of regime change in which a status quo is either maintained
(R = 0) or abandoned (R = 1). Agents simultaneously choose between attacking the
status quo by taking actions in favor of regime change (ai = 1) or not attacking (ai = 0).
The status quo is abandoned if and only if the aggregate attack size A ≡ ∫ 1
0
ai di exceeds
the strength of the status quo that is parameterized by θ ∈ R.
This paper focuses on two speciﬁc regime change events or crises: bank failure after a
run and sovereign debt restructuring. Agents correspond to bank creditors who withdraw
funds from their bank and debt holders who do not roll over short-term government debt,
respectively. The strength of the status quo measures a bank’s investment proﬁtability,
such as the health of its loan book, and a sovereign’s solvency, liquidity, or regional
competitiveness.
The core of the setup is a coordination motive between agents. The relative payoﬀ
from attacking depends on whether the status quo is abandoned and on the relative cost
of attacking, parameterized by r ∈ (0, 1), such as foregone interest payments:
u(ai = 1, A, θ)− u(ai = 0, A, θ) =

1− r A ≥ θ
if
−r A < θ
(1.1)
Since behavior is pinned down by the payoﬀ diﬀerence, the payoﬀ from not attacking is
constant and normalized to zero.12
This payoﬀ speciﬁcation makes the agents’ actions strategic complements: an agent’s
incentive to attack the status quo increases in the mass of attacking agents. Speciﬁcally,
an individual agent ﬁnds it optimal to attack the regime if and only if the probability of
12This is common in the literature on global coordination games; see, for example, Angeletos et al.
(2006, 2007) and Edmond (2012).
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regime change is no less than the cost of attacking. The role of coordination is partic-
ularly highlighted if there is complete information about the strength of the status quo.
Then, the game has two equilibria in pure strategies for θ ∈ (0, 1): no agent attacks and
the status quo is maintained (A∗ = 0 < θ), or all agents attack and the status quo is
abolished (A∗ = 1 > θ). There is a unique equilibrium in dominant strategies for extreme
values of the strength of the status quo. All agents attack A∗ = 1 if the regime is weak
(θ ≤ 0), while all agents refrain from attacking A∗ = 0 if the regime is strong (θ ≥ 1).
Agents have incomplete information about the strength of the status quo, sharing
a common prior:
θ ∼ N
(
µ,
1
α
)
(1.2)
For example, such a common prior is induced by a public signal about the strength of
the status quo: µ ≡ θ + η, where the independent noise term η is normally distributed
with mean zero and precision α ∈ (0,∞), and agents initially had an improper uniform
prior. The mean of the common prior µ is also referred to as the fundamental. Following
the global game literature pioneered by Carlsson and van Damme (1993), agents have
dispersed private information about the strength of the status quo upon receiving a noisy
private signal:
xi ≡ θ + ǫi (1.3)
where the idiosyncratic noise ǫi is identically and independently normally distributed
across agents with zero mean, uninformed precision γU ∈ (0,∞), and is also independent
of the fundamental. All distributions are common knowledge.
The game has two stages. At the coordination stage, agents simultaneously decide
whether to attack the status quo upon observing the private signal. The coordination
stage is preceded by an information acquisition stage during which agents simultaneously
decide whether to become informed at a cost c > 0.13 The information cost captures the
ﬁnancial cost of acquiring information and the cost of resources to process information.14
Speciﬁc examples are the cost of hiring analysts and investment in IT infrastructure
to improve data analysis. Informed agents will receive a more precise private signal at
the coordination stage, raising their precision to γI ∈ (γU ,∞). Let ni ∈ {I, U} denote
13See section 1.6 for an extension with ex-ante heterogeneity in the cost of becoming informed.
14This cost may also capture the mental cost of information processing, as highlighted in the rational
inattention literature.
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the information acquisition choice of agent i and n =
∫ 1
0
1{ni = I}di the aggregate
proportion of informed agents. Agents who acquire information are also called informed
agents and the subscript z ∈ {I, U} is used to distinguish an agent’s information choice.
The following timeline summarizes the above:
Stage 1: Information acquisition stage
• Agents have a common prior about the strength of the status quo.
• Agents simultaneously decide whether to become informed at a cost.
Stage 2: Coordination stage
• Agents receive a private signal about the strength of the status quo.
– Informed agents obtain a more precise private signal.
• Agents simultaneously decide whether to attack.
• The state of the regime is observed and payoﬀs are realized.
1.3 Equilibrium
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium consists of: (i) individual information acquisition choices
n∗i ∈ {I, U} for each agent; (ii) the aggregate proportion of informed agents n∗ ∈ [0, 1];
(iii) individual attack choices a∗i ∈ {0, 1} for each agent at the coordination stage; and
(iv) the aggregate mass of attacking agents A∗ ∈ [0, 1]. The consistency of individual
choices with aggregate proportions requires:
n∗ =
∫ 1
0
1{n∗i = I}di (1.4)
A∗ =
∫ 1
0
a∗idi (1.5)
Furthermore, the behavior of each agent is individually rational. At stage 1, each agent
optimally decides whether to acquire information, which depends on the aggregate pro-
portion of informed agents, the common prior, and the information cost: n∗i = n
∗
i (n
∗;µ, c).
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At stage 2, each agent optimally decides whether to attack, which depends on the infor-
mation choice, the aggregate proportion of informed agents, and the private information
received: a∗i = a
∗
i (n
∗
i , n
∗; xi2). The speciﬁcs about the individually optimal behavior will
be described when analyzing the decisions at each stage.
To construct the equilibrium, taking a sequential approach is useful. I start by de-
riving the optimal behavior at the coordination stage for any given proportion of informed
agents n∗, which summarizes the behavior at the information acquisition stage. Next,
I derive the optimal behavior at the information acquisition stage. My main interest is
to explore the link between information acquisition and coordination, and to analyse the
eﬀect of changes in the common prior that give rise to the ampliﬁcation and contagion
mechanisms presented in sections 1.4 and 1.5, respectively.
1.3.1 Stage 2: Coordination stage
For a given set of information choices {n∗i }i∈[0,1], the coordination stage is a standard
game of imperfect information, once an agent’s signal xi is established as his type. A
strategy si is a mapping from the signal into the binary action space: si : R→ {0, 1} for
a given individual information choice n∗i and the aggregate proportion of informed agents
n∗. An agent’s expected utility from attacking conditional on his private information
xi, his information choice n∗i , and the aggregate proportion of informed agents n
∗ is
E[u(ai = 1)|xi, n∗i , n∗] = −r + Pr{A(s−i) ≥ θ|xi, n∗i , n∗}. As each agent is atomistic, the
aggregate attack size is unaﬀected by the individual attack decision. Optimality for agent
i at the coordination stage requires that strategy si maximizes his conditional expected
utility, taking all other agents’ strategies s∗−i as given.
I focus on symmetric equilibria in monotone threshold strategies at the coordination
stage throughout. This is without loss of generality, as shown with an argument based on
iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies by Frankel et al. (2003), Morris and Shin
(2003), and Goldstein (2005). Thus, the equilibrium at stage 2 for a given proportion
of informed agents is fully characterized by an attacking threshold for the informed
and uninformed agent (xI(n∗), xU(n∗)) and a aggregate threshold (θ(n∗)). Each agent
optimally follows a threshold strategy, whereby an agent i attacks the status quo if and
only if his signal is below an attacking threshold. This threshold depends on whether the
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agent is informed or uninformed and the aggregate proportion of informed agents:
a∗i = 1⇔ xi ≤ x(n∗i , n∗) ≡ xI(n∗)1{n∗i = I}+ xU(n∗)1{n∗i = U} (1.6)
Turning to the aggregate level, the status quo is abandoned if and only if it is weaker
than the aggregate threshold:
R∗i = 1⇔ θ ≤ θ(n∗) (1.7)
These three thresholds are determined by a critical mass condition at the aggregate level
and an indiﬀerence condition for both the informed and uninformed agent as derived
below.
First, an agent i uses his private signal to form a posterior about the strength of
the status quo:
θ|xi, n∗i = z ∼ N
(
αµ+ γzxi
α + γz
,
1
α + γz
)
where normality is preserved, the posterior mean is a weighted average of the common
prior and the private signal, and the posterior precision is the sum of the precisions of
the prior and of the signal (see DeGroot (1970), for example). An informed agent (z = I)
receives a more precise private signal and relies on it more than an uninformed agent.
Furthermore, the precision of the posterior is higher for an informed agent. Next, an
agent with information choice n∗i assigns the following probability to an abandonment of
the status quo:
Pr{θ ≤ θ(n∗)|xi, n∗i = z} = Φ
(√
α + γz
[
θ(n∗)− αµ+ γzxi
α + γz
])
where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
As the probability of regime change strictly decreases in an agent’s signal, a threshold
strategy is indeed optimal.
An agent who receives the threshold signal xi = xz(n∗) is indiﬀerent between at-
tacking and not attacking the status quo. Therefore, the indifference conditions state
that the probability of regime change evaluated at the attacking threshold must equal the
cost of attacking for both informed and uninformed agents, which yields the attacking
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thresholds:
xz(n
∗) = θ(n∗) +
α
γz
[θ(n∗)− µ]−
√
α + γz
γz
Φ−1(r) (1.8)
Since all agents play the threshold strategy with thresholds xI(n∗) if informed, and xU(n∗)
if uninformed, the aggregate attack size for any realised strength of the status quo θ is:
A(n∗; xI(n
∗), xU(n
∗), θ) =
∫ 1
0
1{xi ≤ xz(n∗)|θ, n∗i = z}di
= n∗Φ (
√
γI [xI(n
∗)− θ]) + (1− n∗)Φ (√γU [xU(n∗)− θ])
by the law of large numbers. The critical mass condition states that the aggregate
attack size is just suﬃcient to bring down the status quo when its strength equals the
aggregate threshold:
θ(n∗) = A
(
n∗; θ(n∗), xI(n
∗), xU(n
∗)
)
(1.9)
Combining indiﬀerence conditions with the critical mass condition, the equilibrium ag-
gregate threshold at the coordination stage θ = θ(n∗;µ, r), for any given proportion of
informed agents, is implicitly deﬁned by:
θ(n∗) = n∗Φ
(
α√
γI
[
θ(n∗)− µ]−√1 + α
γI
Φ−1(r)
)
· · · (1.10)
· · ·+ (1− n∗)Φ
(
α√
γU
[
θ(n∗)− µ]−√1 + α
γU
Φ−1(r)
)
Similar to Morris and Shin (2003), a unique solution to equation (1.10) for any given
n∗ is ensured by a suﬃciently precise private signal of the uninformed agent. Under
this condition, the slope of the left-hand side of equation (1.10) exceeds the slope of the
right-hand side for any proportion of informed agents, ensuring at most one crossing:
γU > γU ≡
α2
2π
⇒ 1 > Aθ ≡ ∂A(n
∗, θ(n∗))
∂θ
∀ n∗ ∈ [0, 1]
Uniqueness follows from A ∈ [0, 1] and the fact that the realised strength of the status quo
is unbounded. Once the unique aggregate threshold is determined, the attack thresholds
xz(n
∗) are backed out from the indiﬀerence conditions.
The object of interest is the probability of a crisis, which strictly increases in the
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aggregate threshold:
Pr{θ ≤ θ(n∗)} = Φ (√α[θ(n∗)− µ]) (1.11)
For a given proportion of informed agents, the outcome of the coordination stage is
characterized by the fundamental captured by the common prior µ, and considerations
about the actions of other players captured by the cost of attacking r. Understanding how
the aggregate threshold at the coordination stage varies with the fundamental and the
cost of attacking is useful for constructing the equilibrium at the information acquisition
stage. It also highlights the role of endogenous information acquisition. As explained
below, a ﬁnancial crisis is less likely if the status quo is stronger or the cost of attacking
higher.
First, the equilibrium aggregate threshold decreases in the cost of attacking (∂θ(n
∗)
∂r
<
0). This strategic effect relates to an agent’s incentive to attack the status quo based on
other agents’ actions. If the attack cost r is high, few other agents attack, and the
expected aggregate attack size is low. Therefore, an individual agent tends not to attack
the status quo himself. In summary, the strategic eﬀect suggests that an agent has a
small incentive to attack the status quo when the attack cost is high. In other words,
even a weak regime is maintained if agents do not expect other agents to attack.
Second, the equilibrium aggregate threshold decreases in the common prior (∂θ(n
∗)
∂µ
=
− Aθ(θ)
1−Aθ(θ)
< 0). This fundamental effect relates to an agent’s incentive to attack the status
quo based on its commonly believed strength. If the common prior is strong, the required
aggregate attack size to abandon the regime is high, inducing an individual agent not to
attack the status quo himself. In summary, the fundamental eﬀect suggests that an agent
has a small incentive to attack the status quo when it is commonly believed to be strong.
In other words, even a weak regime is maintained if agents expect it to be strong.
The following parameter constraint ensures that a change in the proportion of in-
formed agents aﬀects the probability of crisis. That is, the fundamental effect and the
strategic effect never cancel as the proportion of informed agents changes.
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Condition 1. Parameter constraint A:
µ 6= µˆ(r) ≡ Φ (κ1Φ−1(r))− κ0Φ−1(r) (1.12)
κ0 ≡
√
γI(α + γU)−
√
γU(α+ γI)
α[
√
γI −√γU ] (1.13)
κ1 ≡ ακ0√
γI
−
√
1− α
γI
=
ακ0√
γU
−
√
1− α
γU
(1.14)
Note that ∂µˆ
∂r
< 0 and µˆ → ∞ if r → 0 as well as µˆ → −∞ if r → 1. Parameter
constraint A excludes a part of the parameter space with zero measure only.
The responsiveness of the aggregate threshold at the coordination stage to changes
in the proportion of informed agents is summarized in lemma 1. This result, which links
the information acquisition stage to the coordination stage, is useful for continuing the
construction of equilibrium at the information acquisition stage. Furthermore, it states
a condition under which a larger proportion of informed agents increases the probability
of a ﬁnancial crisis.
Lemma 1. Suppose that the private signal of the uninformed agent is sufficiently precise
(γU > γU). If parameter constraint A holds (µ 6= µˆ(r)), then the threshold fundamental
at the coordination stage responds to changes in the proportion of informed agents:
∂θ
∂n∗
6= 0 (1.15)
Furthermore, the threshold fundamental increases (or decreases) in the proportion of in-
formed agents if the fundamental lies above (or below) the line µˆ(r) defined by parameter
constraint A:
∂θ
∂n∗
(µ− µˆ(r)) > 0 (1.16)
See Appendix (1.8.1) for a proof. Figure 1.1 illustrates parameter constraint A and
the results of lemma 1.
A larger proportion of informed agents implies a reduced reliance on the common
prior, since more agents have access to precise private information. To illustrate this
point, consider the special case of strong fundamentals (µ > µˆ(r)), where the crisis
probability increases in the proportion of informed agents. Given the high common prior
about the strength of the status quo relative to the attack cost, an uninformed agent only
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Figure 1.1: The chart depicts the combinations of the fundamental (µ) and cost of attack-
ing (r) that violate parameter constraint A: µ = µˆ(r). If the regime is strong (µ > µˆ(r)),
then the aggregate threshold at the coordination stage increases in the proportion of
informed agents ( ∂θ
∂n∗
> 0). By contrast, the aggregate threshold decreases in the propor-
tion of informed agents ( ∂θ
∂n∗
< 0) if the regime is weak (µ < µˆ(r)). Parameter values are
α = 2, γU = 3, and γI = 4.
attacks the status quo upon receiving a “particularly low” private signal. In contrast, an
informed agent also attacks for “moderately low” private signals. This is for two reasons:
(i) an informed agent relies more on the private signal relative to the prior, thus expecting
the status quo to be weaker; and (ii) an informed agent expects more informed agents
to join the attack as they must have received similar moderately low signals. Both the
fundamental and the strategic reasons cause an informed agent to attack for a greater
range of private signals than the uninformed agent. Therefore, a larger proportion of
informed agents make a crisis more likely if the fundamental is strong.
1.3.2 Stage 1: Information acquisition stage
Equipped with the results from the coordination stage, I now turn to the information
acquisition stage. To evaluate the incentives to become informed, the expected utilities
of an informed (ni = I) and uninformed (ni = U) agent are compared. The expected
utility has two terms. An agent receives the payoﬀ (1 − r) if he attacks (xi ≤ xz) when
the status quo is abandoned (θ ≤ θ), while he incurs the cost of attacking r if he attacks
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when the status quo is maintained (θ > θ):
EU I(n∗) = (1− r)
∫ θ
−∞
∫ xI
−∞
f I(x|θ)dx dG(θ)− r
∫ ∞
θ
∫ xI
−∞
f I(x)dx dG(θ)
EUU (n∗) = (1− r)
∫ θ
−∞
∫ xU
−∞
fU(x|θ)dx dG(θ)− r
∫ ∞
θ
∫ xU
−∞
fU(x)dx dG(θ)
where G(θ) is the cumulative distribution function of the fundamental (that is distributed
as N (µ, 1
α
)
), while f z(x) is the probability distribution function of private signals condi-
tional on a realized fundamental θ and on the information choice z (that is distributed as
N (θ, 1
γz
)). The dependence of the three thresholds on the proportion of informed agents
is suppressed for brevity.
Becoming informed, or receiving a more precise private signal, has two beneﬁts.
First, it allows an agent to form a more precise posterior about the fundamental. Second,
it allows an agent to form a more precise posterior about the size of the aggregate attack.
This follows from the fact that an informed agent has a more precise posterior about other
agents’ signals than an uninformed agent does. The beneﬁt from becoming informed is
measured in terms of the expected utility diﬀerence denoted by D(n∗) ≡ EU I(n∗) −
EUU (n∗), which depends on the aggregate proportion of informed agents:
D(n∗) = r
∫ ∞
θ
Γ(θ)g(θ)dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Type-I error
− (1− r)
∫ θ
−∞
Γ(θ)g(θ)dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Type-II error
(1.17)
Γ(θ) ≡
∫ xU
−∞
fU(x|θ)dx−
∫ xI
−∞
f I(x|θ)dx (1.18)
where Γ(θ) captures the diﬀerence between the probability of an attacking uniformed
agent and the probability of an attacking informed agent for a given realization of the
fundamental.
Informed agents make fewer errors in their attacking decisions. To see this, observe
that the beneﬁt from being informed consists of two terms. The ﬁrst term states that an
informed agent attacks the status quo less often when there is no regime change (type
I error). This term is proportional to the cost of attacking unsuccessfully. The second
term states that an informed agent refrains from attacking the status quo less often when
there is a regime change (type II error). This term is proportional to the foregone payoﬀ
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from attacking successfully. To understand why informed agents make fewer errors in
their attacking decisions, as reﬂected in the beneﬁt from becoming informed, consider
the special case of vanishing noise in the private signal if informed (γI →∞). Then, an
informed agent never makes an error: he never attacks when the regime is maintained and
always attacks when it is abandoned. Subsequently, the beneﬁt from becoming informed
in this special case reduces to the sum of the type I and type II errors of uninformed
agents.
There is strategic complementarity in information acquisition choices. In other
words, the beneﬁt from becoming informed increases in the proportion of informed agents.
Thus, the strategic complementarity in action present at the coordination stage translates
into strategic complementarity at the information acquisition stage. In the words of
Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009), who study a diﬀerent coordination game: “Agents who
want to do what others do, want to know what others know.” (p. 223). This result carries
over to a global game of regime change studied in the present paper and is summarized
in lemma 2.
Lemma 2. Suppose that the private signal of the uninformed agent is sufficiently precise
(γU > γU). Then, there is strategic complementarity in information acquisition:
∂D
∂n∗
≥ 0 (1.19)
If parameter constraint A holds, the inequality is strict.
See Appendix (1.8.2) for a proof.
In order to understand the strategic complementarity in information acquisition,
recall the two eﬀects of becoming informed. First, informed agents forecast the funda-
mental θ more precisely, but this eﬀect is independent of the proportion of informed
agents. Second, informed agents forecast the behavior of other agents more precisely. In
particular, an informed agent is better at forecasting other informed agents than other
uninformed agents. Therefore, the second beneﬁt of becoming informed increases in the
proportion of informed agents, establishing the strategic complementarity in information
acquisition. In short, information supports coordination.
Further insight can be obtained by comparing this paper to Grossman and Stiglitz
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(1980). These authors study an economy with costly private acquisition of information
about the value of a risky assets and the eﬀect on subsequent trade in this asset. Un-
informed traders only learn by observing the market price, which is more informative
the larger the proportion of informed traders. Consequently, the private incentive to
become informed decreases in the proportion of informed agents (strategic substitutes),
since agents do not wish to incur the information cost if the publicly available market
price reveals large amount of private information. In contrast, an agent’s incentive to ac-
quire information increases in the proportion of informed agents (strategic complements)
in this paper, since information supports coordination. If many agents are informed,
acquiring private information helps an agent align his actions with the action of others
at the coordination stage.15
To construct equilibrium, it is useful to determine the boundaries of the beneﬁt
from becoming informed, summarized in lemma 3.
Lemma 3. Suppose that the private signal of the uninformed agent is sufficiently precise
(γU > γU). The benefit from becoming informed is positive but smaller than unity:
0 < D(n∗) < 1 (1.20)
See Appendix (1.8.3) for a proof.
Consider an agent’s optimal information acquisition choice. Given the binary action
ni ∈ {I, U} at stage 1, and the fact that each agent is atomistic with no eﬀect on the
aggregate proportion of informed agents, an agent optimally acquires information if and
only if the information cost is at most the beneﬁt from becoming informed:
n∗i = I ⇔ c ≤ D(n∗) (1.21)
where the beneﬁt from becoming informed depends on the proportion of informed agents.16
Thus, it is dominant for an agent to acquire information when the information cost is low
(c < D(0)) and not to acquire information when the information cost is high (c > D(1)).
15Another difference relates to the existence of equilibrium. While Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)
demonstrate the non-existence of a competitive equilibrium for a vanishing information cost, a unique
equilibrium exists for that limiting case in the present paper.
16Heterogeneity in the information cost is analysed in section 1.6.
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An agent’s optimal information acquisition choice depends on the proportion of informed
agents for an interim information cost (D(0) ≤ c ≤ D(1)), where an agent is indiﬀerent
between acquiring and not acquiring information if and only if c = D(n∗).
The equilibrium at the information acquisition stage is constructed by combining
these individual optimality conditions, the previous two lemmas, and the consistency be-
tween individually optimal information acquisition choices and the aggregate proportion
of informed agents. It follows directly that there always exists an equilibrium and that
the information cost determines the number of equilibria. Building on this, proposition
1 describes the equilibrium behavior.
Proposition 1. (Multiplicity) Suppose that an uninformed agent’s signal is sufficiently
precise (γU > γU) and that parameter constraint A holds (µ 6= µˆ(r)). Then, the optimal
behavior of agents at the coordination stage is uniquely pinned down for a given propor-
tion of informed agents and is characterized by a threshold strategy. An informed (or
uninformed) agent attacks if and only if his private signal falls short of the threshold
xI(n
∗) (or xU(n
∗)). There is a regime change if and only if the realized strength of the
status quo falls short of the aggregate threshold (θ(n∗)). These thresholds are determined
in equations (1.8) and (1.10).
The number of equilibria in the overall game depends on the information cost:
• If the information cost is low (c < D(0)), then there exists a unique symmetric
equilibrium in which all agents acquire information (n∗ = 1).
• If the information cost is high (c > D(1)), then there exists a unique symmetric
equilibrium in which no agent acquires information (n∗ = 0).
• If the information cost takes an interim value (D(0) ≤ c ≤ D(1)), then there
exist three equilibria. The two symmetric equilibria described above prevail and
there is also an asymmetric equilibrium. In the asymmetric equilibrium, agents are
indifferent between becoming informed and remaining uninformed, and the aggregate
proportion of informed agents is determined by the indifference of the marginal agent
to become informed: n∗ = D−1(c).
Given the strict monotonicity of the beneﬁt from becoming informed in the propor-
tion of informed agents, the proportion of informed agents is uniquely determined in the
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asymmetric equilibrium. However, I will focus on the stable symmetric equilibria.
0 D(0) D(1)
c
n∗ = 1
n∗ = 0
Figure 1.2: A visualization of the equilibrium with information acquisition. The infor-
mation cost c and the beneﬁt from becoming informed D are on the axis.
Similar to the case without information acquisition and with complete information,
there is a unique equilibrium for extreme values of information cost, while there are mul-
tiple equilibria for interim values. Figure 1.2 illustrates the link between the information
cost and the number of equilibria.
1.4 Amplification
This section shows how endogenous acquisition of private information after adverse news
about the fundamental ampliﬁes the probability of a crisis. Adverse news about the fun-
damental is modelled as a reduction in the common prior µ and has two consequences.
First, there is the standard eﬀect on the probability of a crisis given by the fundamen-
tal eﬀect that increases the crisis probability ( ∂θ
∂µ
< 0). With endogenous information
acquisition, there is an additional novel eﬀect via the beneﬁt from becoming informed.
Formally, the beneﬁt from becoming informed changes with the mean of the funda-
mental, as shown in Appendix (1.8.4):
∂D
∂µ
= −g(θ) ∂θ
∂n∗
(1.22)
If the fundamental is strong (µ > µˆ(r)) – above the line in ﬁgure 1.1 – a larger proportion
of informed agents leads to a higher probability of crisis ( ∂θ
∂n∗
> 0). Therefore, the beneﬁt
from becoming informed increases (∂D
∂µ
< 0). Since information supports coordination,
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becoming informed is particularly valuable when the common prior moves towards an
interim value, which is the line µˆ(r) speciﬁed by parameter constraint A. On this line,
the behavior of other agents is least certain, that is strategic uncertainty is at its highest.
Intuitively, information is more valuable the greater the uncertainty about other agents’
behavior, as in the case of an interim common prior. By contrast, information is of little
value if the behavior of other agents is quite certain, as in the case of a particularly high
(or low) fundamental. Taken together, reducing the mean of the fundamental from a high
level increases strategic uncertainty and therefore the beneﬁt from becoming informed.
Changes to the beneﬁt from becoming informed aﬀect the equilibrium proportion
of informed agents, as illustrated by ﬁgure 1.3. Speciﬁcally, there exists a range of infor-
mation costs for which information acquisition (n∗ = 1) becomes the unique equilibrium,
where it was one of several equilibria previously. Similarly, there is a range of information
costs for which information acquisition (n∗ = 1) becomes one of several equilibria, where
it was not an equilibrium previously. The equilibrium proportion of informed agents
weakly increases for these information cost ranges.17 If more agents become informed,
such as a switch from n∗ = 0 to n∗ = 1, the probability of crisis increases. If parame-
ter constraint A holds and the equilibrium proportion of informed agents changes, the
probability of a crisis increases strictly.
0 D(0) D˜(0) D(1) D˜(1)
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n∗ = 0
Figure 1.3: A visualization of the equilibrium with information acquisition equilibrium
before and after a reduction in the common prior. Tildes are used to distinguish the
latter case. The information cost c and various beneﬁts from becoming informed D are
on the axis.
Adverse news about the fundamental also increases the probability of a crisis if
17As shown in section 1.6, the equilibrium proportion of informed agents strictly increases if there is
heterogeneity about the information cost.
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the common prior is low (µ < µˆ(r)) – below the line in ﬁgure 1.1. In this case, a
smaller proportion of informed agents leads to a higher probability of crisis ( ∂θ
∂n∗
< 0).
Therefore, the beneﬁt from becoming informed decreases (∂D
∂µ
> 0). Hence, there is a
range of information costs for which no information acquisition (n∗ = 0) becomes the
unique equilibrium, where it was one of several equilibria previously. Similarly, there is a
range of information costs for which no information acquisition (n∗ = 0) becomes one of
several equilibria, where it was not an equilibrium previously. The equilibrium proportion
of informed agents weakly decreases for these information cost ranges. If fewer agents
become informed, such as a switch from n∗ = 1 to n∗ = 0, the probability of crisis
increases. If parameter constraint A holds and the equilibrium proportion of informed
agents changes, the probability of a crisis increases strictly.
Proposition 2 summarizes the ampliﬁcation eﬀect after adverse news about the
fundamental that reduces the common prior.
Proposition 2. (Amplification) Suppose that an uninformed agent’s signal is suffi-
ciently precise (γU > γU). Endogenous acquisition of private information amplifies the
probability of a financial crisis:
∆θ
∆n∗
∆n∗
∆D
∆D
∆µ
= −g(θ)
(
∆θ
∆n∗
)2
∆n∗
∆D
≤ 0 (1.23)
The inequality is strict if both parameter constraint A holds and there is a change in the
equilibrium proportion of informed agents.
An important insight from this paper is that information supports coordination by
allowing an agent to align his action with that of other agents at the coordination stage.
But how is the incentive to acquire information aﬀected by adverse news that reduces
the common prior? The higher the degree of uncertainty, the more useful information
is. Intuitively, there is not much need for information if the behavior of other agents
is almost certain, as happens for extremely high or low common priors. In contrast,
strategic uncertainty is highest for an interim common prior, that is when µ is close to
µˆ(r) speciﬁed by parameter constraint A. Therefore, the beneﬁt from becoming informed
increases when the common prior was high initially and is then reduced by adverse news.
As strategic uncertainty is higher, the beneﬁt from becoming informed increases, inducing
information acquisition.
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1.5 Contagion
This section considers an extension with a spillover of public information about another
region, such as news about the default of Lehman or about a debt restructuring in Greece.
I examine how public information spillovers aﬀect incentives to acquire private informa-
tion about the health of a related bank or sovereign. More speciﬁcally, I show that the
probability of a crisis in one region increases after adverse news about another region due
to changes in the incentives to acquire private information. In short, I provide a novel
contagion mechanism based on endogenous acquisition of information.
Forbes (2012) suggests that there is a distinction between interdependence and
contagion. Interdependence is deﬁned as the correlation between regions in all states
of the world, whereas contagion is the spillover of adverse shocks across (potentially
interdependent) regions. My model features contagion in this broad deﬁnition, since
adverse news about another region directly raises the probability of a crisis. However,
the model also features contagion in a narrower sense that goes beyond interdependence.
Adverse news induces the acquisition of private information that increases the probability
of a crisis. Therefore, private information acquisition can lead to strong contagion between
otherwise loosely connected regions.
Let us turn to the speciﬁcation of the spillover of public information. There is
another region, such as another bank or sovereign, with fundamental θ2. Before making
their private information acquisition choice, agents receive a noisy public signal about
the other region y:18
y ≡ θ2 + ν (1.24)
ν ∼ N
(
0,
1
β
)
(1.25)
where the noise ν is independent of fundamental in second region θ2, and the precision
β captures the intensity of media coverage of the other region’s event or the quality
of a public announcement in the spirit of Morris and Shin (2002). Fundamentals are
correlated between regions (ρ ∈ (0, 1)) to capture asset commonality between banks
(such as joint investment in asset-backed securities) and trade, ﬁnancial, or political links
18For example, agents play an otherwise identical coordination game of regime change in the other
region. Once the aggregate attack size A2 is observed, the strength of the status quo is inferred.
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among sovereigns:19
θ2 ≡ ρθ + (1− ρ)µ+ ξ (1.26)
ξ ∼ N
(
0,
1
αξ
)
where the fundamentals have the same mean and share the same precision if the noise
term is scaled accordingly (αξ = α1−ρ2 ).
The public information about the other region changes the common prior among
agents about the present region because of correlated fundamentals:
θ|y ∼ N
(
µ˜,
1
α˜
)
(1.27)
µ˜ ≡ µ+ ρ
1 + α/β
[y − µ]
α˜ ≡ α 1 + α/β
1− ρ2 + α/β
where receiving a public signal increases the precision of the common prior and shifts
it towards the signal. The common prior is unchanged, however, if fundamentals are
uncorrelated (ρ→ 0), or the public signal y is imprecise (β → 0). Parameter constraint
A generalizes accordingly, where (µ, α) are replaced by (µ˜, α˜). This restriction on the
parameter space still has zero measure.
Adverse news about the other region (a lower y) has two eﬀects. First, standard
information spillover based on correlated fundamentals (interdependence or broad conta-
gion according to Forbes (2012)) is a direct eﬀect that is also present in models without
information acquisition. It unambiguously raises the probability of a crisis, mirroring the
previous fundamental eﬀect:
∂θ
∂y
< 0 (1.28)
There is also a second eﬀect if information is endogenous. Adverse news about
another region, such as learning about a crisis elsewhere, is a wake-up call that induces
agents to become informed. Indeed, adverse news increases an agent’s incentive to become
19In case of the ongoing euro zone sovereign debt crisis, the correlation across countries also originates
from the scarcity of rescue funds, such as the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the
European Stability Mechanism (ESM).
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informed for strong fundamentals (µ˜ > ˆ˜µ):
∂D
∂y
= − ρ
1 + α
β
g(θ)
∂θ
∂n∗
(1.29)
Intuitively, becoming informed particularly pays oﬀ when there is more uncertainty about
other agents’ behaviour, as in the run-up to a crisis. In turn, the probability of a crisis in-
creases in the proportion of informed agents, since informed investors react more strongly
to bad private signals than uninformed investors. Therefore, the endogenous acquisition
of private information triggered by adverse news about a crisis elsewhere increases the
probability of a crisis in the present region.
The novel contagion result based on endogenous information acquisition is summa-
rized in proposition 3 and illustrated in ﬁgure 1.4.
Proposition 3. (Contagion) Suppose that an uninformed agent’s signal is sufficiently
precise (γU > γU). Endogenous acquisition of private information increases the probability
of a financial crisis after observing adverse news about another region:
∆θ
∆n∗
∆n∗
∆D
∆D
∆y
= − ρ
1 + α
β
g(θ)
(
∆θ
∆n∗
)2
∆n∗
∆D
≤ 0 (1.30)
The inequality is strict if both the adjusted parameter constraint A holds and there is a
change in the equilibrium proportion of informed agents.
0 D(0) D˜(0) D(1) D˜(1)
c
n∗ = 1
n∗ = 0
Figure 1.4: A visualization of the equilibrium with information acquisition after learning
about a crisis elsewhere.
In eﬀect, here I have generalized the ampliﬁcation eﬀect presented in the previous
section to the case of public information spillovers, provided the additional public infor-
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mation is not uninformative (β > 0) and the regions are positively correlated (ρ > 0).
The argument also extends to negatively correlated fundamentals.20 Then, good news
about another region is bad news for a given region, possibly due to a competition eﬀect.
The proposed contagion eﬀect prevails after good news about another region. Further-
more, adverse news about another region is good news for agents in the present region
that will aﬀect their information acquisition in such a way that the probability of a crisis
decreases. Again, information acquisition ampliﬁes the initial response.
1.6 Ex-ante heterogeneity
This section considers an extension with ex-ante heterogeneity among agents that delivers
a unique equilibrium and strengthens the ampliﬁcation result. Agents are ex-ante iden-
tical in the baseline model and therefore make the same information acquisition choice
in equilibrium, generating multiple equilibria. By contrast, this section explores the con-
sequences of ex-ante heterogeneity, for example in the cost of becoming informed that
reﬂects diﬀerences in the skill of generating and processing information. While either dif-
ferent or more general forms of ex-ante heterogeneity can be considered - and the result
generalized accordingly, the following simple speciﬁcation suﬃces to illustrate the eﬀect
of ex-ante heterogeneity on the information acquisition choice and on the ampliﬁcation
eﬀect.
Let the individual cost of information acquisition ci now be drawn independently
from a uniform distribution over a unit interval, which is also the distribution of costs in
the population by a law of large numbers:
ci ∼ U [0, 1] (1.31)
As before, an agent optimally acquires information if and only if the beneﬁt weakly
exceeds the cost:
n∗i = I ⇔ ci ≤ D(n∗) (1.32)
Optimal information acquisition is characterized by a threshold strategy. Let c¯ be the cut-
20For instance, it is sometimes argued that a negative correlation exists between long-term German
borrowing costs and adverse news about peripheral euro zone countries.
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oﬀ value below which an agent acquires information. Then, the equilibrium proportion of
informed agents is equal to the cut-oﬀ, given the distributional assumption (n∗(c¯) = c¯),
which can be generalized to an increasing function in the cut-oﬀ level for other continuous
distributions. Since the individual information cost equals the beneﬁt from becoming
informed for the marginal agent, the equilibrium cut-oﬀ value c¯ is the ﬁxed point of
D(n∗(c¯)).
Uniqueness requires that there is only one ﬁxed point ofD(·). Recall that 0 < D < 1
(lemma 3) and ∂D
∂n∗
≥ 0, with strict inequality if and only if parameter constraint A holds
(lemma 2). Appendix 1.8.2 shows that a strengthened lower bound on the precision of
the uninformed agent suﬃces for ∂D
∂n∗
< 1, which completes the proof of the uniqueness of
the cut-oﬀ level c¯. Proposition 4 summarizes the new result on equilibrium uniqueness.
Proposition 4. (Ex-ante heterogeneity and uniqueness) Let µ 6= µˆ(r) (parameter
constraint A), γU > γ
′
U
≡ α2
2pi+1−2
√
2pi
> γ
U
, and the cost of information acquisition be
dispersed: ci ∼ U [0, 1]. Then, there exists a unique equilibrium given by the unique cut-off
value c¯ implicitly defined by c¯ = D(n∗(c¯)). Agents become informed at the information
acquisition stage if and only if their individual information cost is no larger than the
cut-off cost level:
n∗i = I ⇔ ci ≤ c¯ = n∗ (1.33)
Agents attack the status quo at the coordination stage if and only if their private signal
falls short of the threshold xU(c¯) if uninformed or xI(c¯) if informed. The status quo is
abandoned if and only if the fundamental falls short of the threshold θ(c¯).
Ex-ante heterogeneity strengthens the ampliﬁcation eﬀect. In contrast to the base-
line speciﬁcation, the increase in the equilibrium proportion of informed agents is now
strict whenever the beneﬁt from becoming informed increases. To illustrate this, consider
again the case of a strong common prior. Adverse news about the fundamental increase
the beneﬁt from becoming informed (∂D
∂µ
<0), which strictly increases the equilibrium
cut oﬀ value c¯ and thus the equilibrium proportion of informed agents (∂n
∗
∂µ
< 0). Since
informed agents attack more often than uninformed agents if the common prior is strong,
the probability of a ﬁnancial crisis now increases strictly.
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1.7 Conclusion
How does the acquisition of private information aﬀect the probability of a bank run or
sovereign debt crisis? Here I study a global coordination game of regime change in which
a crisis occurs if a suﬃcient number of creditors withdraw from a bank or do not roll over
debt to a sovereign. Creditors receive noisy private information about the solvency of the
bank or sovereign and choose ex-ante whether to improve the quality of their information
at a cost.
My main contribution is to demonstrate that endogenous information acquisition
after adverse news increases the probability of a ﬁnancial crisis. Adverse news about the
solvency of the bank or sovereign increases the strategic uncertainty among creditors,
making the behaviour of other creditors harder to predict. Since information supports
coordination, an individual creditor wishes to acquire information to align his action with
that of other creditors. If the initial fundamentals are high, informed creditors are more
likely than uninformed creditors to withdraw funds from a bank or to not roll over debt
to a sovereign. Thus, the acquisition of private information ampliﬁes the probability of a
bank run or a sovereign debt crisis.
My second contribution is the demonstration of a novel contagion eﬀect based on en-
dogenous information acquisition. Suppose that there is public information spillover, such
as news about a crises elsewhere, which captures events like the failure of another bank
(Lehman) or sovereign debt restructuring (Greece). Crises elsewhere induce creditors to
become informed about the solvency of their bank or sovereign. Since the ampliﬁcation
eﬀect established above increases the probability of a ﬁnancial crisis in the initially unaf-
fected region, the acquisition of private information is a powerful contagion mechanism
for bank runs and sovereign debt crises.
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Responsiveness of aggregate threshold (proof of lemma 1)
This proof is in three steps. First, diﬀerentiating the equilibrium threshold fundamental
with respect to the proportion of informed agents yields:
∂θ
∂n∗
=
Φ
(
α√
γI
[θ − µ]−
√
1 + α
γI
Φ−1(r)
)
− Φ
(
α√
γU
[θ − µ]−
√
1 + α
γU
Φ−1(r)
)
1− Aθ(θ)
(1.34)
where the aggregate attack size A is equal to the right-hand side of equation (1.10). Sec-
ond, note that 0 < Aθ(θ) < 1, where the second inequality follows from the suﬃcient con-
dition for uniqueness at the coordination stage (γU > γU). Third, parameter constraint
A ensures that the numerator of the partial derivative is non-zero, which can be seen by
contradiction. Suppose that the numerator is zero. Rewriting yields θ = θˆ ≡ µ+ κ
α
Φ−1(r).
Inserting this in the deﬁning equation of θ, equation (1.10), yields µ = µˆ(r), as was to be
shown. In summary, the overall partial derivative ∂θ
∂n∗
is non-zero if parameter constraint
A holds and the signal of the uninformed agent is suﬃciently precise.
Using the same argument, the numerator of the partial derivative is positive if and
only if the fundamental is strong relative to the strategic eﬀect: µ > µˆ(r). Likewise, the
numerator is negative if fundamentals are weak: µ < µˆ(r).
1.8.2 Strategic complementarity in becoming informed (proof of
lemma 2)
I show that ∂D
∂n∗
≥ 0, establishing strategic complementarity in information acquisition.
Using the Leibniz rule, the change in the beneﬁt from becoming informed as more agents
are informed is:
∂D
∂n∗
=
[
1−Aθ(θ)
]
g(θ)
(
∂θ
∂n∗
)2
≥ 0 (1.35)
The sign arises since the probability distribution function g is always positive and Aθ(θ) ∈
(0, 1) as implied by the suﬃcient condition for uniqueness at the coordination stage
(γU > γU). Furthermore, the inequality is strict if parameter constraint A holds, which
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ensures the responsiveness of the aggregate threshold with respect to the equilibrium
proportion of informed agents (lemma 1).
A change in the proportion of informed agents has two eﬀects on the beneﬁt from
becoming informed. First, there is a direct eﬀect via a change in the threshold fundamen-
tal (∂D
∂θ
∂θ
∂n∗
). Second, there is an indirect eﬀect via a change in the attacking thresholds
( ∂D
∂xz
∂xz
∂θ
∂θ
∂n∗
). It can be shown that the indirect eﬀect is always zero:
∂D
∂xz
= r
∫ ∞
θ
f z(xz)g(θ)dθ − (1− r)
∫ θ
−∞
f z(xz)g(θ)dθ = 0 (1.36)
This is an envelope theorem result. The threshold xz is chosen such that the marginal
cost of attacking the status quo when it is maintained balances with the marginal beneﬁt
from attacking when the status quo is abandoned.
Using lemma 1, the change in the beneﬁt from becoming informed as more agents
are informed can be rewritten as:
∂D
∂n∗
=
g(θ)Γ(θ)2
1−Aθ(θ)
(1.37)
where g ≤ 1√
2pi
and Γ < 1 as shown in appendix 1.8.3. Therefore, ∂D
∂n∗
< 1 is ensured by
1 − Aθ(θ) > 1√2pi for all c¯ ∈ [0, 1]. Since γI > γU , this inequality is hardest to satisfy for
n∗ = 0. Rewriting yields that γU > γ′U ≡
(
α√
2pi−1
)2
. In summary, γU > γ′U suﬃces for
∂D
∂n∗
< 1.
1.8.3 Bounds on expected utility difference
I start by showing thatD < 1. Note that Γ is the diﬀerence of two cumulative distribution
functions such that Γ ≤ 1 and −Γ ≤ 1. Thus, D ≤ r ∫∞
θ
dG(θ) − (1 − r) ∫ θ−∞ dG(θ) =
r −G(θ) < r < 1. Taken together, D < 1 without imposing parameter constraints.
It remains to be shown D(n∗) > 0 for all n∗, which is accomplished indirectly. First,
note that D → 0 as γI → γU . Intuitively, there is no beneﬁt from being informed if an
informed agent receives a signal that is as precise as an uninformed agent’s signal. Second,
note that D > 0 as γI →∞. An informed agent no longer makes an error in his decision
to attack, such that the beneﬁt of becoming informed equals the strictly positive foregone
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expected utility of an informed agent due to his type I and type II errors. Third, the
beneﬁt from becoming informed strictly increases in the precision of the informed agent.
Intuitively, being informed is more valuable when the improvement in the private signal
is larger. Taking these three points together, it must be the case 0 < D(n∗) < 1 for any
n∗ and any γI ∈ (γU ,∞).
1.8.4 Effect of fundamental on benefit from becoming informed
A change in the fundamental µ aﬀects the aggregate threshold θ, the attacking thresholds
xz, and the distribution of fundamentals g(θ). As shown in Appendix 1.8.2, the eﬀect
on the attacking thresholds is zero by an envelope theorem argument. Using the Leibniz
rule, the partial eﬀect via the aggregate threshold is: ∂D
∂θ
∂θ
∂µ
= −g(θ)Aθ(θ) ∂θ∂n∗ . The partial
eﬀect via a change in the distribution is obtained by noting that ∂g(θ)
∂µ
= g(θ)α(θ − µ).
Partial integration of Γ(θ)∂g(θ)
∂µ
and applying the envelope theorem once more yields:
∂D
∂g(θ)
∂g(θ)
∂µ
= −g(θ)[1−Aθ(θ)] ∂θ∂n∗ . Therefore, the total eﬀect on the beneﬁt from becoming
informed is:
∂D
∂µ
= −g(θ) ∂θ
∂n∗
(1.38)
which is non-zero if parameter constraint A holds.
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Chapter 2
Bank runs, liquidity, and
macro-prudential regulation
This chapter examines the role of liquidity in an economy with many banks subject to runs
and systemic liquidation costs. First, the presence of liquidity drives a wedge between the
amount of withdrawals and liquidation. This restores multiple equilibria even when a
global game refinement is used. Second, systemic liquidation costs imply that one bank’s
liquidity holding reduces the liquidation costs of other banks. The positive implication is
the partial substitutability of private liquidity holdings as banks free-ride on other banks’
liquidity. The normative implication is that banks hold insufficient liquidity relative to
a constrained planner, interpreted as a macro-prudential authority that internalizes the
system-wide effects of liquidity. Comparative statics analyses with respect to the expected
investment return and the liquidation cost are performed.
JEL Classifications: G01, G11, G21, G28, G33
Keywords: Bank runs, liquidity, macro-prudential regulation, multiple equilibria
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2.1 Introduction
A crucial concept in economics and ﬁnance is liquidity. An asset is liquid if it can be
converted into cash quickly and at a low cost.1 Holding enough liquid assets is important
for ﬁnancial intermediaries, as they may face sudden withdrawals from their investors.
This applies to both the classical case of a run on a commercial bank by retail investors
(Diamond and Dybvig (1983)) and modern-day runs, such as institutional investors who
withdraw from money market mutual funds (e.g. Wermers (WP)). Liquidity also plays a
major role in recent proposals for the regulation of ﬁnancial intermediaries.2
This paper examines the role of liquidity in an economy with many banks subject
to runs and systemic liquidation costs. Banks invest in a long-term project and hold
some liquidity to prepare for early withdrawals from investors. The risky project has
a higher expected return but is costly to liquidate before maturity. Liquidity drives a
wedge between the amount of withdrawals from investors and the amount of liquidation,
thereby trading oﬀ the opportunity cost of the higher expected investment return with the
beneﬁt from reducing costly liquidation. The proﬁtability of a bank’s project depends
on aggregate economic conditions such as business cycle movements.3 Investors have
the option to withdraw before the maturity of the investment project. They receive
noisy private news about the aggregate economic condition before deciding whether to
withdraw. A bad economic condition results in a large number of investors with bad
signals and therefore many withdrawals. This leads to run on a bank that has insuﬃcient
liquidity to serve all withdrawing investors and has to liquidate the project at a cost.
Systemic liquidation costs, whereby one bank’s liquidation cost increases in the other
bank’s liquidation volume, are also explored to analyze the system-wide dimension of
liquidity.
The ﬁrst contribution is to show that the presence of liquidity restores multiple
1An example is US sovereign debt, whose market is characterized by a large trading volume. Therefore,
selling a given quantity can be realized fast and with a low price impact.
2This is in contrast to the financial regulation during the last three decades that focused mainly on
capital. The current proposals include the introduction of rules governing the composition of banks’
balance sheets envisaged under the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s proposed Liquidity Cov-
erage Ratio (LCR) or Net Stable Funding Ratio (BCBS (2010b,c)). Both regulatory tools seek to impose
limits on the degree of liquidity mismatch on a bank’s balance sheet by, for example, imposing a lower
bound on banks’ liquidity ratios.
3Business cycle movements affect the default rates of the loan portfolio of banks. Alternatively, there
is a shock to an asset class in which banks are invested, such as asset-backed securities.
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equilibria – even if a global game reﬁnement is used (Proposition 5). When banks hold
some liquidity to prepare for withdrawals from investors, there exists an equilibrium
without liquidation if the economic condition is good. Some investors receive bad news
about the economic condition, infer that their bank’s proﬁtability is low, and withdraw.
But since the true state of the economy is good, this is a small number of investors and
the available liquidity suﬃces to serve them. Most investors receive good news and do not
withdraw, as such costly liquidation is avoided. Likewise, an equilibrium with liquidation
exists if the economic condition is weak. Then many investors receive bad news and
withdraw. As a result, liquidity is exhausted and costly liquidation occurs. In sum, I
show that there exists an interim range of the economic condition that supports both
equilibria.
The equilibrium with liquidation corresponds to the unique Bayesian equilibrium
in other global game models of bank runs, such as Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) and
Morris and Shin (2000). Why is the other equilibrium without liquidation absent in
these papers? As investors receive noisy news, some investors will always receive a bad
signal and withdraw – even if the economic condition is good. Without liquidity, there
is always positive liquidation to serve withdrawing investors, ruling out the possibility of
an equilibrium without liquidation. In fact, I show formally that the equilibrium without
liquidation vanishes as the level of liquidity vanishes (Corollary 1). Therefore, liquidity
is crucial for re-establishing multiple equilibria in bank run coordination games. The
multiplicity result does not rely on endogenous information acquisition, which has also
been shown to break uniqueness (e.g. Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009), Ahnert (WP)).
The second contribution is to demonstrate a role for a macro-prudential regulation of
liquidity. To this end, I compare the privately optimal and socially constrained eﬃcient
levels of liquidity.4 When liquidation costs are systemic, insuﬃcient liquidity at one
bank means more liquidation for a given amount of withdrawals and therefore a higher
liquidation cost for other banks in the system. The positive implication is the partial
substitutability of private liquidity holdings as banks free-ride on other banks’ liquidity
(Proposition 6). The normative implication is that the private banking system holds
insuﬃcient liquidity relative to a constrained planner (Proposition 7). As a planner
4In order to analyze the effects of ex-ante liquidity holdings, I need to select an equilibrium for
economic conditions that support both equilibria. To focus on the macro-prudential implications of
liquidity, I select the equilibrium with liquidation.
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internalizes the system-wide eﬀects of liquidity, this planner is naturally interpreted as a
macro-prudential authority.
Proposition 8 summarizes comparative static results that illustrate the intuition
of private and social liquidity choices. The level of liquidity held by a bank trades oﬀ
the marginal cost in terms of foregone expected investment return with the marginal
beneﬁts in terms of avoiding costly liquidation, which reduces coordination failure among
investors. A higher expected investment return (better economic conditions on average)
increases the opportunity cost of liquidity and therefore reduces a bank’s optimal liquidity
level. By contrast, a higher liquidation cost increases the marginal beneﬁt from avoiding
liquidation and therefore increases a bank’s optimal liquidity level. By extension, the
comparative statics for the constrained eﬃcient liquidity choice yield the same signs as
the constrained planner faces the same trade-oﬀ, just with a higher marginal beneﬁt from
liquidity.
Systemic liquidation costs, which generate a positive externality from liquidity and
are at the core of my normative result, are micro-founded by a body of literature. Limited
participation in asset markets can lead to cash-in-the-market pricing and therefore under-
pricing of assets (Allen and Gale (1994)). Similarly, liquidation values are depressed after
an industry-speciﬁc shock since distress sales take place to unlevered industry outsiders
who value industry-speciﬁc assets less (Shleifer and Vishny (1992)). Finally, ﬁnancial
arbitrageurs cannot pick up assets in ﬁre sales since they are constrained by losses and
outﬂows themselves (Gromb and Vayanos (2002)).
The paper closest in terms of methodology is Morris and Shin (2000), who build on
the seminal work of Carlsson and van Damme (1993), using global games techniques to
analyze a withdrawal game in the spirit of Diamond and Dybvig (1983).5 The Bayesian
equilibrium of Morris and Shin (2000), which features runs on illiquid but solvent banks,
is unique. By contrast, I show in my ﬁrst contribution how the presence of liquidity breaks
equilibrium uniqueness by allowing for another equilibrium without runs. Furthermore,
I extend the analysis to multiple banks to explore the eﬀect of systemic liquidation costs
5Multiple equilibria in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) occur because of the self-fulfilling beliefs. If an
investors fears withdrawals by other investors, then this will imply costly liquidation of the bank’s assets
that reduces a non-withdrawing investor’s payoff. Therefore, each investor finds it optimal to withdraw,
constituting a bank-run equilibrium. Likewise for the no-run equilibrium.
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on ex-ante incentives to hold liquidity.6 Vives (WP) and Morris and Shin (WP) also
analyze investor withdrawal games and the eﬀect of liquidity. However, they abstract
from conditions that can induce the no-liquidation equilibrium and are not concerned
with the ex-ante portfolio choice.
Allowing for multiple banks, my second contribution is to examine the consequences
of systemic liquidation costs for ex-ante liquidity choices, both privately and socially.
Other consequences of systemic liquidation costs have already been analyzed. Wagner
(2011) studies the diversiﬁcation-diversity trade-oﬀ in the ex-ante portfolio choice. Since
joint liquidation is costly ex-post, investors have an incentive to hold diverse portfolios.7
In contrast, I examine the consequences for ex-ante liquidity holdings in the presence of
systemic liquidation costs and analyze the consequences for ﬁnancial intermediaries that
may be subject to runs. Uhlig (2010) analyzes endogenous liquidation costs in a model
with outside investors and a two-tiered banking sector. The arising system-wide exter-
nality generates strategic complementarities in the depositors’ withdrawal decisions also
present in my model. His focus is on a positive analysis of the previous ﬁnancial crisis and
discusses some ex-post policy interventions. By contrast, my focus is on optimal (liquid-
ity) regulation from an ex-ante perspective. Studying ex-ante policy has the advantage of
precluding the issue of moral hazard arising from an ex-post policy intervention, a theme
also stressed by Farhi and Tirole (2012).
The literature on macro-prudential regulation is growing fast. Korinek (2011) ana-
lyzes risk-taking in an economy in which systemic externalities take the form of pecuniary
ﬁre sales and provides a micro-founded rationale for macro-prudential policy, such as a
Pigouvian tax on risk-taking or capital requirements. Korinek (WP) contrasts ex-ante
macro-prudential regulation with ex-post policy interventions. In line with the present
paper, Farhi and Tirole (2012) highlight the importance of a macro-prudential approach
to contain a crisis ex-ante.
6Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) also use global games techniques to generate a unique equilibrium in a
setup closer to the original model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), for example preserving the sequential
service constraint. The same comments apply.
7Wagner (2009) also stresses the role of endogenous liquidation costs, showing that they give rise to
cross-bank externalities. The implications for optimal bank portfolios are ambiguous, however, as banks
may be ‘too correlated’ (as in the standard case) or ‘too diversified’ under laissez faire, implying that
regulatory treatment should be heterogeneous.
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2.2 The Model
The economy extends over three dates labelled as initial (t = 0), interim (t = 1), and ﬁnal
(t = 2), and it is inhabited by a continuum of investors and two banks n ∈ {A,B}. The
notion of ﬁnancial intermediation provided by banks is not limited to the traditional case
of retail investors and commercial banks but incorporates, for instance, money market
mutual funds and investment banks.8 There is a single physical good used for consump-
tion and investment.
Investors There is a unit mass of initially identical investors i ∈ [0, 1] with idiosyncratic
uncertainty about their consumption needs (Diamond and Dybvig (1983)). All investors
are uncertain at the initial date and privately learn their consumption preference θi ∈
{0, 1} at the interim date. Each investor is either early (θi = 1) and wishes to consume
at the interim date or late (θi = 0) and wishes to consume at the ﬁnal date. Investors
can store between the interim and the ﬁnal date. The ex-ante probability of being an
early investor is λ ≡ Pr{θi = 1} ∈ (0, 1), which is identical across investors and also the
share of early investors by the law of large numbers. A investor’s utility function is:
Ui(c1, c2) = θic1 + (1− θi)c2 (2.1)
where ct is consumption at date t, and θi represents an idiosyncratic liquidity shock.
Investors are endowed with two units at the initial date and randomly deposit at either
bank; as such each bank receives one unit of deposits.
Investment opportunities Two investment opportunities in the form of constant-
return-to-scale technologies are available at the initial date (Table 2.1). First, storage
is universally available and yields a unit safe return. Since it matures after one period,
storage is referred to as liquidity. Second, an investment project, such as lending to
a productive sector, is available to banks.9 A project matures at the ﬁnal date and
8Also, the investors and banks of this model can be interpreted as local and global banks in the spirit
of Uhlig (2010). Then a prematurely withdrawing investor represents a run of a local bank on a global
bank, an arguably reasonable feature of the recent financial crises.
9The motive for the existence of banks is different from that in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). While
these authors demonstrate a role for a bank as provider of liquidity insurance for risk-averse investors,
banking in this model arises from a bank’s enhanced access to investment projects because of an advantage
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Asset t = 0 t = 1 t = 2
Storage (0→ 1) −1 1
Project (0→ 2) −1 ln (1− ln)(r − χ(ln, l−n))
Table 2.1: Investment technologies
yields a stochastic return with mean r¯ > 1. Premature liquidation of the project at
the interim date is costly. Similar to Morris and Shin (2000), liquidation of an amount
ln ∈ [0, 1] by bank n at par reduces the ﬁnal-date return by χ(ln, l−n), where χ(·) ≥ 0
is the cost function of premature liquidation. The reduction to the ﬁnal-date payoﬀ is
implied by a lender-of-last-resort policy, for instance. Liquidation costs are modelled to
be proportional to the total amount of liquidation:
χ(ln, l−n) ≡ χ[ln + d l−n] (2.2)
where χ ∈ (0, 1) measures the cost of liquidation, and d ∈ {0, 1} is a dummy that is one
when systemic liquidation costs are present. To avoid strict dominance of the project,
r¯ < 1 + 2χ is assumed throughout.
Bank-speciﬁc liquidation costs are the source of strategic complementarity between
late investors of a given bank. According to Ahnert and Nelson (WP), individual liq-
uidation costs are discussed in James (1991) and Mullins and Pyle (1994). These costs
comprise direct liquidation expenses and a reduction in the ‘going concern’ value of bank
assets under distress. The empirical literature typically ﬁnds these liquidation costs to
be large: of the order of 30% of bank assets on average.10
Systemic liquidation costs or ﬁre-sales, if present, are the source of strategic com-
plementarity between late investors across banks and create an externality in a bank’s
liquidity choice. Liquidation costs are systemic if there is limited liquidity in the market
(Allen and Gale (1994)), a ﬁre sale to industry outsiders (Shleifer and Vishny (1992)),
in monitoring, for example.
10Mullins and Pyle (1994) and Brown and Epstein (1992) present estimates of direct liquidation ex-
penses of around 10%, varying between 17% for assets relating to owned real estate to 0% for liquid
securities for assets in receivership at the FDIC. Adding to direct expenses losses associated with forced
liquidation, James (1991) gives an average total cost of 30% of a failed bank’s assets. Similar orders
of magnitude are reported in Bennett and Unal (WP), whose sample runs for much longer, covering
1986-2007.
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or ﬁnancial constraints of arbitrageurs (Gromb and Vayanos (2002)). Since liquidation
depresses not only a given bank’s liquidation value, but also another bank’s liquidation
value, there is a negative externality from liquidation.
Information structure The investment return r, a measure of the economic condition
such as a key macroeconomic variable, is distributed normally with precision α ∈ (0,∞):
r ∼ N
(
r¯,
1
α
)
The investment return is realised at the interim date but not publicly observed. However,
each investor receives a private signal xi about the return:
xi ≡ r + ǫi
ǫi ∼ N
(
0,
1
γ
)
where the idiosyncratic noise ǫi has zero mean, precision γ ∈ (0,∞), and is independently
and identically distributed across investors and independent of the investment return. All
distributions are common knowledge.
Banks At the initial date banks simultaneously choose their liquidity holdings (yA,
yB) and invest the remainder in the project. The liquidity choice is publicly observed.
Investors that withdraw at the interim date receive unity, while investors that wait for
the ﬁnal date receive a pro-rata payment of a bank’s assets, which includes the proceeds
from investment in the project.11 Abstracting from a misalignment of incentives between
the bank manager and investors, a bank’s objective is to maximize the expected utility
of investors.12
11See, for example, Dasgupta (2004), Goldstein (2005), and Shapiro and Skeie (WP) for a similar
assumption on the interim-date withdrawal payment. Therefore, banks are viable at the interim date as
the promised payment does not exceed the liquidation value. The focus of the present paper is on the
effect of liquidity on equilibrium multiplicity as well as the consequences of a fire-sale externality from
one bank’s liquidation decision on the liquidity choice of banks. My main results hold for alternative
assumptions about the interim payment.
12This objective arises as an equilibrium outcome in a generalized model with competition for deposits.
The competition between banks for investors implies that banks offers the best possible liquidity holding
to investors. In a related paper, Gale (2010) shows that a bank’s optimal behaviour under free entry
and subject to the investors’ participation constraint can be expressed as the solution to a contracting
problem in which the welfare of investors is maximised subject to the zero-profit constraint of the bank.
If any given bank were not to choose this investment plan, it would fail to attract any deposits. Given the
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Banks serve any withdrawals by using liquidity ﬁrst. Let wn ∈ [0, 1− λ] denote the
amount of withdrawals by late investors of bank n. If withdrawals from late investors
are suﬃciently high (wn > yn − λ), the bank partially liquidates its investment project,
where the liquidation amount is given by ln ≡ max{0, wn + λ − yn} ∈ [0, 1 − yn]. The
liquidation amount decreases in a bank’s liquidity holding yn and increases in the amount
of withdrawals by late investors wn.
To prevent costly liquidation, the bank may hold excess liquidity (yn > λ) – more
liquidity than required to serve withdrawals from early investors. Holding excess liquidity
drives a wedge between the proportion of prematurely withdrawing late investors wn and
the liquidation volume of the investment project ln. As it is never optimal to face certain
liquidation, the lower bound of a bank’s liquidity level is the share of early investors
(yn ≥ λ).
Payoffs Early investors always withdraw at the interim date. Late investors that with-
draw at the interim date receive the same payoﬀ as early investors since the liquidity
preference of investors is unobserved by banks. To shed more light on a late investor’s
payoﬀ, consider the cases of no liquidation and positive liquidation in turn.
No liquidation (wn ≤ yn−λ) If few late investors withdraw at the interim date,
excess liquidity holdings yn − λ suﬃce to serve them. There is no liquidation (ln = 0),
and some excess liquidity is carried over to the ﬁnal date. The payoﬀ to a late investor
at the ﬁnal date is:
c2n =
[yn − λ− wn] + (1− yn)r
1− λ− wn (2.3)
where the asset payments available to investors at the ﬁnal date consist of remaining liq-
uidity (yn−λ−wn) and proceeds from investment in the project (numerator), all of which
to be shared with the proportion of investors that wait for the ﬁnal date (denominator).
The realisation of the stochastic investment project r enters this expression, while the
amount of liquidation by the other bank (l−n) has no eﬀect on the payoﬀ of late investors
of bank n in the absence of liquidation (ln = 0).
alignment of interest between a bank and its investors as well as the bank’s enhanced access to projects,
all depositors deposit in full.
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Positive amount of liquidation (wn > yn−λ) If many late investors withdraw
at the interim date, the excess liquidity holding yn − λ is drawn down such that some
amount of the project is liquidated (ln = wn + λ − yn) to serve withdrawing investors.
The payoﬀ to a late investor at the ﬁnal date is:
c2n =
(1− yn − ln)[r − χ(ln, l−n)]
1− λ− wn = r − χ(ln, l−n) (2.4)
A ﬁre-sale externality, which is a negative liquidation externality, is present if and
only if there are systemic liquidation costs (d = 1) and the other bank liquidates a positive
amount (l−n > 0).
Remark 1. Conditional on a positive liquidation (ln > 0), there is a strategic comple-
mentarity between the withdrawal decisions of late investors of the same bank (∂c2n
∂wn
< 0).
If there is also positive liquidation by the other bank (l−n > 0) and systemic liquidation
costs are present (d = 1), there is also strategic complementarity between the withdrawal
decisions of late investors across banks ( ∂c2n
∂w−n
< 0).
There are two dimensions to the strategic behaviour of a late investor. The ﬁrst
dimension is the strategic complementarity between the withdrawal decisions of late in-
vestors of a given bank. More withdrawals by other late investors have two eﬀects. First,
the bank draws down its excess liquidity and then liquidates a larger share of the project.
This eﬀect is detrimental to a late investor who keeps his funds for the ﬁnal date. Second,
there are fewer late investors to share the remaining resources with at the ﬁnal date. This
eﬀect is beneﬁcial for a late investor who keeps his funds. In the positive-liquidation case,
the ﬁrst eﬀect unambiguously dominates and the incentives to withdraw increase in the
proportion of withdrawing late investors (∂c2n
∂wn
= −χ < 0). By contrast, the incentives to
withdraw decrease in the proportion of withdrawing late investors if no liquidation takes
place and the project return is suﬃciently high (r ≥ 1).
The second dimension is a strategic complementarity between the withdrawal de-
cisions of late investors across banks in the presence of systemic liquidation costs. The
more late investors in the other bank −n withdraw, the more of the investment project
of bank −n is liquidated, the lower the ﬁnal-date payoﬀ to investors at bank n due to the
ﬁre-sale externality. This increases the incentive for a late investor of bank n to withdraw
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as well, conditional on positive liquidation at bank n ( ∂c2n
∂w−n
= −χ < 0).
Timeline The following timeline summarizes the model:
Initial date t = 0
• Investors receive their endowment and deposit at banks.
• Each bank holds liquidity yn and invests the remainder 1− yn.
Interim date t = 1
• Each investor privately observes his consumption preferences θi (early or late).
• Each investor receives a private signal xi about the investment return and updates
his forecast about the return and the proportion of withdrawing investors.
• Investors may withdraw, and the mass of late investors that withdraw is wn.
• Banks serve withdrawals using liquidity ﬁrst. If necessary, a bank (partially) liqui-
dates the investment project (liquidation amount ln).
• Early investors consume and withdrawing late investors store their withdrawals.
Final date t = 2
• The investment project matures.
• Remaining late investors receive an equal share of the investment proceeds.
• Late investors consume.
2.3 Equilibrium
There are two stages: a perfect-information portfolio choice stage between banks at
the initial date and an imperfect-information withdrawal stage between investors at the
interim date. As the portfolio choices of banks are observed by investors, the equilibrium is
56 CHAPTER 2. BANK RUNS, LIQUIDITY, AND REGULATION
best characterised by working backwards, starting with the equilibrium in the withdrawal
subgame.
An investor’s strategy is a plan of action for each private signal xi. A proﬁle of
strategies is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the subgame at the interim date if the
actions described by investor i’s strategy maximize his expected utility conditional on
xi, taking as given the strategies followed by all other investors. Threshold strategies are
considered by which a late investor withdraws if and only if his private signal falls short
of a bank-speciﬁc threshold (to be determined): xi < x∗n. These thresholds depend on
the liquidity choices of banks at the initial date: x∗n = x
∗
n(yn, y−n).
Next, consider the game between banks who choose a liquidity level yn. Each bank
takes the eﬀect of its liquidity choice on the bank-speciﬁc withdrawal threshold x∗n(yn, y−n)
into account. I will determine the Nash equilibrium (yA, yB) in the game between banks
at the interim date, where each yn maximizes the bank’s objective function subject to
the eﬀect on the withdrawal threshold, taking as given the level of liquidity held by the
other bank.
Each investor uses his private information xi to update his forecasts about the in-
vestment return and the proportion of withdrawing late investors at either bank. The
posterior distributions are derived in Appendix 2.7.1. Let Ri ≡ r|xi denote the posterior
distribution of the investment return as formed by an investor who receives the private
signal xi. The posterior mean Ri is equivalent to the signal xi because there is a bijective
mapping between them. The equilibrium posterior mean R∗n, which is computationally
more convenient than the equilibrium signal x∗n, is used to describe the equilibrium condi-
tions.13 Likewise, W ni,n ≡ wn|xi and W ni,−n ≡ w−n|xi denote the posterior distributions
of the proportions of withdrawing late investors at the investor’s bank and the other
bank, respectively. Similarly, the expected amount of liquidation by bank n is given by
L
n
i,n.
Consider the equilibrium withdrawal behaviour of investors at the interim date.
Early investors always withdraw, while late investors may withdraw. The bank-speciﬁc
threshold R∗n is deﬁned as the mean of the posterior return that makes a late investor
13Note that both converge as the private noise vanishes (x∗n −R∗n → 0 as γ →∞).
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indiﬀerent between withdrawing and not withdrawing his funds:
1 = c2n(R
∗
n, R
∗
−n) (2.5)
where the left-hand side is the payoﬀ from withdrawing and the right-hand side is the
expected payoﬀ from not withdrawing conditional on the threshold signal x∗n. Equation
(2.5) implicitly deﬁnes the best response function R∗n(R
∗
−n), where investors take the
other bank’s threshold R∗−n as given. The withdrawal threshold of investors of one bank
depends on the threshold of investors in the other bank in case of positive liquidation
(ln > 0) and systemic liquidation costs (d = 1).
The subsequent subsections construct a complete description of equilibrium in the
subgame by analysing the role of liquidity for equilibrium multiplicity and the eﬀect of
systemic liquidation costs. In line with the global games literature (e.g. Morris and Shin
(2003)), I shall assume vanishing private noise (γ →∞) throughout.
2.3.1 No systemic liquidation costs
First consider the case without systemic liquidation costs (d = 0).
No expected liquidation
Suppose the marginal investor expects no liquidation in equilibrium (Ln(x∗n) = 0). Then,
the indiﬀerence condition yields (1 − yn)(R∗n − 1). If there is no intermediation (yn = 1
or "narrow banking"), then the withdrawal decision is irrelevant since the bank’s assets
are always unity and the investor receives unity irrespective of his withdrawal decision.
If there is intermediation (yn < 1), the withdrawal threshold is unity (R∗n = 1). To be
consistent with zero liquidation as expected by the marginal investor, the bank’s liquidity
level must be suﬃciently high. The marginal investor expects half of the late investors of
mass 1− λ to withdraw as private noise vanishes (W nn → 1−λ2 ). Therefore, liquidity must
be abundant to serve withdrawals from early and late investors:
yn ≥ λ+ 1− λ
2
(2.6)
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Zero actual liquidation arises if and only if the number of withdrawals does not
exceed excess liquidity (wn ≤ yn − λ), requiring a suﬃciently high realisation of the
investment return (r ≥ r˜0). As the distribution of signals conditional on the economy-
wide return is N
(
r, 1
γ
)
, the lower bound on the realised investment return is:
r˜0 ≡ 1− α
γ
(r¯ − 1)− 1√
γ
Φ−1
(
yn − λ
1− λ
)
→ 1
where Φ−1(·) is the inverse of the cumulative probability function of the standard normal
distribution and r˜0 < 1. More liquidity ensures that more withdrawals are consistent
with zero actual liquidation. Hence, the lower bound on the investment return decreases
in the liquidity holding ( ∂r˜0
∂yn
< 0). As private noise vanishes, the lower bound converges
to unity (r˜0 → 1). Lemma 4 summarizes:
Lemma 4. Consider the withdrawal subgame without systemic liquidation costs (d = 0),
vanishing private noise (γ → ∞), and abundant liquidity yn ∈ [ (1+λ)2 , 1]. Then any
threshold equilibrium has the following features:
• L∗n = 0: the marginal investor expects no liquidation;
• x∗n → 1: a late investor withdraws if and only if his signal falls short of unity;
• l∗n = 0⇔ r ≥ 1: no actual liquidation occurs if and only if the economic condition
is sufficiently good.
In sum, the level of liquidity determines whether the marginal investor expects posi-
tive liquidation to occur in equilibrium, while the realised economic condition determines
whether liquidation actually occurs.
Positive expected liquidation
For the marginal investor to expect a positive amount of liquidation in equilibrium
(Ln(x∗n) > 0), the bank’s liquidity level must be scarce:
yn <
1 + λ
2
(2.7)
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As I show in section 2.3.3, liquidity is scarce in equilibrium if it has a high opportunity
cost in terms of a high expected investment return (r¯ ≥ r¯L). With positive expected
liquidation the indiﬀerence condition of the marginal investor reduces to:
R∗n = 1 + χ[(1− λ)Φ(
√
δ[R∗n − r¯] + λ− yn)]
where δ ≡ α2(α+γ)
γ(α+2γ)
collects precision parameters. As in Morris and Shin (2000), unique-
ness requires the slope of the left-hand side to exceed the slope of the right-hand side and
vanishing private noise is suﬃcient for this requirement.14 A closed-form expression for
the threshold is obtained for vanishing private noise:
R∗n → 1 + χ[
1− λ
2
+ λ− yn] (2.8)
Coordination failure between investors induces the threshold to exceed unity (R∗n >
1), the eﬃcient liquidation level. If there is no cost of premature liquidation (χ → 0),
then the strategic complementarity between investors of the same bank is absent and the
eﬃcient allocation obtains in the withdrawal game. For a positive liquidation cost (χ > 0),
however, there is coordination failure between investors that pushes the threshold above
the eﬃcient level. Fearing that other late investors withdraw prematurely and thereby
cause costly liquidation, another late investor has an incentive to withdraw prematurely –
even if the nominal investment return exceeds the payoﬀ from withdrawing prematurely.
Furthermore, the threshold is below the expected return of the project (R∗n < r¯) if
the (individual) liquidation cost is suﬃciently low relative to the expected return (r¯ >
1 + χ(1−λ)
2
).
Actual liquidation occurs in equilibrium if the realised investment return is suf-
ﬁciently low (r < r˜1). Finding the equilibrium proportion of withdrawals for a given
investment return as in the previous case, the upper bound on the investment return is:
r˜1 ≡ R∗n −
α
γ
(r¯ − R∗n)−
1√
γ
Φ−1
(
yn − λ
1− λ
)
→ R∗n
14The requirements is 1 > D∗n ≡ χ(1 − λ)
√
δφ
(√
δ[R∗n − r¯]
)
> 0, where φ(·) is the probability
distribution function of the standard normal distribution. This condition is satisfied as the private noise
vanishes since δ → 0.
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Holding more liquidity has two eﬀects. First, it allows to serve a larger proportion
of withdrawing investors without liquidating the project. As liquidation is costly, this
reduces the amount of coordination failure between late investors for a given investment
return and thus the withdrawal threshold:
∂R∗n
∂yn
= − χ
1−D∗n
< 0 (2.9)
Second, more liquidity reduces the upper bound on the investment return for which
the equilibrium with positive liquidation exists ( ∂r˜1
∂yn
< 0). More liquidity implies more
available resources for withdrawing investors and therefore requires a worse economic
condition to sustain positive liquidation as supposed. Lemma 5 summarizes:
Lemma 5. Consider the withdrawal subgame without systemic liquidation costs (d = 0),
vanishing private noise (γ →∞), and scarce liquidity yn ∈
(
λ, (1+λ)
2
)
. Then any threshold
equilibrium has the following features:
• L∗n > 0: the marginal investor expects liquidation;
• x∗n → 1 + χ[1+λ2 − yn] > 1 : a late investor withdraws if and only if his signal falls
short of this threshold;
• l∗n > 0 if and only if r < x∗n: actual liquidation occurs if and only if the economic
condition is sufficiently bad.
Taking the previous lemmas together, the overall threshold equilibrium in the with-
drawal subgame, which depends on the realised economic condition r and the amount of
liquidity yn held by the bank, is described in proposition 5:
Proposition 5. Consider the withdrawal subgame without systemic liquidation costs (d =
0) and vanishing private noise (γ →∞).
• If liquidity is abundant (yn ∈ [ (1+λ)2 , 1]), then there exists a unique threshold equi-
librium in the subgame. The marginal investor expects no liquidation to take place
(Ln(x
∗
n) = 0) and the implied withdrawal threshold is x
∗
n = 1. No liquidation oc-
curs if the economic condition is good, while some liquidation occurs if it is bad
(l∗n = 0⇔ r ≥ 1).
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• If liquidity is scarce (yn ∈
[
λ, (1+λ)
2
)
), however, then there exist multiple equilibria in
the subgame. The marginal investor expects liquidation to take place (Ln(x
∗
n) > 0)
and the implied withdrawal threshold is x∗n → 1+χ[1+λ2 −yn] > 1. The no-liquidation
equilibrium occurs for a good economic condition (r ≥ 1), while the equilibrium
with liquidation occurs for a bad economic condition (r < x∗n). Therefore, multiple
equilibria exist for a range of economic conditions [1, x∗n].
• The range of economic conditions that support multiple equilibria shrinks as the
bank’s liquidity increases (∂x
∗
n
∂yn
< 0).
How does the multiplicity result relate to bank run models that obtain a unique
equilibrium with positive liquidation (Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), Morris and Shin
(2000))? If there is no excess liquidity (yn → λ), as in these papers, the no-liquidation
equilibrium disappears. In fact, the lower bound on the economic condition consis-
tent with no liquidation becomes arbitrarily high (r˜0 → ∞) for bounded private noise
(γ < γ < ∞). Thus, any equilibrium features a positive amount of liquidation in these
papers. By contrast, liquidity drives a wedge between the amount of withdrawals and the
liquidation volume in the present paper. If liquidity is scarce and the economic condition
good, this supports an equilibrium without liquidation apart from the usual equilibrium
with liquidation.
Corollary 1. If there is no liquidity to serve late investors (yn → λ), the equilibrium
without liquidation vanishes (r˜0 → ∞). Therefore, models without liquidity and unique
equilibria, such as Morris and Shin (2000), are a special case of my model with vanishing
liquidity for late investors.
Finally, consider the marginal beneﬁts of liquidity on the threshold equilibrium in
the withdrawal subgame. There is no marginal beneﬁt of liquidity in the no-liquidation
equilibrium since the lower bound of the economic condition is unaﬀected by liquidity. By
contrast, the marginal beneﬁt from liquidity is positive in the equilibrium with liquidation.
On the one hand, liquidity reduces the range for which the equilibrium with liquidation
exists (also for bounded private noise). On the other hand, more liquidity reduces the
amount of withdrawals and therefore costly liquidation for a given investment return.
The marginal cost of liquidity is the reduction in the payoﬀ to a late investors conditional
on no-liquidation.
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2.3.2 Systemic liquidation costs
I now consider the case with systemic liquidation costs (d = 1). Suppose that the
marginal investor expects liquidation (Lnn(x
∗
n) > 0) and liquidation by the other bank
(Ln−n(x
∗
n) > 0). If the marginal investor expects no liquidation by the other bank, then
systemic liquidation costs have no impact and the equilibrium threshold is determined as
in the previous case. The indiﬀerence condition of the marginal investor becomes:
R∗n(R
∗
−n; yn, y−n) = 1 + χ
[
(1− λ)Φ
(√
δ[R∗n − r¯]
)
+ λ− yn
]
+ · · · (2.10)
· · ·+ χ
[
(1− λ)Φ
(√
δ(1 +
γ
δ
)[R∗−n − r¯]−
γ
δ
√
δ[R∗n − r¯]
)]
As the marginal investor takes the withdrawal threshold of investors in the other bank
R∗−n as given, equation 2.10 speciﬁes a best-response function since there exists a unique
solution R∗n for any given R
∗
−n as shown below.
Following Morris and Shin (2003) and Goldstein (2005), the uniqueness proof is
in two steps. First, a unique solution R∗n must be obtained for any R
∗
−n, requiring
that the slope of the left-hand side of the best response function exceeds the slope of
the right-hand side. Second, there is a unique intersection of best response functions,
requiring that the best response function is bounded and that its slope is strictly within
zero and one. Since the cumulative distribution function lies within zero and one, these
conditions are all satisﬁed if the private noise is suﬃciently small, yielding a unique
solution RA(yA, yB), RB(yB, yA).15
Coordination failure again induces an ineﬃciently large withdrawal threshold (R∗n >
1). Coordination failure now takes place not only between investors of a given bank, but
also between investors of diﬀerent banks. Fearing that late investors of another bank
withdraw, thereby increasing the liquidation volume of the other bank and therefore the
liquidation costs of a given bank, a late investor of the given bank has a higher incentive
to withdraw at the interim date as well.
Furthermore, the threshold is below the expected return of the project (R∗n < r¯) if
15The slope of the right-hand side is now:
Dn ≡ χ(1− λ)
√
δ{φ
(√
δ[R∗n − r¯]
)
− γ
α
φ
(√
δ(
α + γ
γ
)[R∗
−n − r¯]−
γ
α
√
δ[R∗n − r¯]
)
}
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the (total) liquidation cost is suﬃciently low relative to the expected return (r¯ > r¯L ≡
1+χ(1−λ)). The behaviour of investors is consistent with a liquidation in equilibrium if
the realised investment return is suﬃciently bad (r < r˜1). As the private noise vanishes,
the symmetric thresholds converge to:16 17
R∗A = R
∗
B = R
∗ ≡ 1 + χ(1 + λ− yA − yB) ∈ (1, r¯) (2.11)
The banks’ liquidity choices aﬀects the withdrawal thresholds. More liquidity allows
to serve more withdrawing investors and thus reduces the coordination failure among
investors of a given bank. Thus, more liquidity held by bank n reduces the withdrawal
threshold R∗n. Because of systemic liquidation costs, there is also coordination failure
among investors of diﬀerent banks. More liquidity held by a given bank reduces the
degree of this coordination failure and therefore the other bank’s threshold R∗−n:
∂R∗n
∂yn
=
∂R∗n
∂y−n
= −χ < 0
Lemma 6 summarizes the new results in the case of systemic liquidation costs.
Lemma 6. Consider the withdrawal subgame with systemic liquidation costs (d = 1),
vanishing private noise (γ →∞), and scarce liquidity (yn ∈ (λ, (1+λ)2 ). Then, the marginal
investor expects liquidation to occur (Ln(x
∗
n) > 0), and the withdrawal threshold is x
∗
n →
1+χ[1+λ−yA−yB] ∈ (1, r¯) if r¯ > r¯L = 1+χ(1−λ). There is actual liquidation (l∗n > 0)
if and only if th economic condition is bad (r ≤ r˜1 → x∗n). The equilibrium threshold
highlights the system-wide effects of liquidity because more liquidity held at either bank
reduces the withdrawal threshold of a given bank.
16This can be proved by contradiction. Suppose that R∗
A
> R∗
B
. Then, WA
B
→ 0 and WB
A
→ (1− λ).
The implied expressions for the thresholds can never satisfy the supposed inequality R∗
A
> R∗
B
. The
argument applies for R∗
A
< R∗
B
as well. Therefore, R∗
A
= R∗
B
as claimed.
17The symmetry in the liquidation cost function implies an equal weight of liquidity choices in the
withdrawal threshold expression. This can be relaxed, for example by putting a larger weight on the
own liquidation volume or with a convex liquidation specification. Either specification implies a larger
weight of a bank’s withdrawal threshold on its own liquidity. For example, a liquidation cost function
that is linear in both the own and the total liquidation volume x(ln, l−n) = χln(ln + dl−n) yields
R∗n → 1 + χ(1 + λ− yA − yB)(1+λ2 − yn) in the case of systemic liquidation costs.
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2.3.3 Optimal portfolio choice
I complete the characterisation of the equilibrium by studying the banks’ privately op-
timal liquidity choice at the initial date. To generate macro-prudential implications, I
consider the setup with systemic liquidation costs and scarce liquidity. A lower bound
on the expected investment return derived below suﬃces to generate scarce liquidity in
equilibrium. As multiple equilibria occur for scarce liquidity (see proposition 5), some
equilibrium selection is required. Since liquidity has a beneﬁcial eﬀect in the equilibrium
with liquidation, I assume that this equilibrium in the subgame is selected whenever it
exists.18 A bank’s objective function is the expected utility of its investors derived in
Appendix 2.7.2 and given by:
EUn(yn, y−n) = yn + (1− yn)
[
F (R∗) · 1 + (1− F (R∗)) ·
(
r¯ +
f(R∗)
α(1− F (R∗))
)]
(2.12)
where f(r) = φ(
√
α[r − r¯]) is the probability distribution function of the normally dis-
tributed investment return and F (r) the associated cumulative distribution function. The
expected utility has two terms. The ﬁrst term is the amount of liquidity, and the second
term is the payoﬀ from the investment (1 − yn). If the investment return falls short of
the threshold R∗, which occurs with probability F (R∗), the project is liquidated. Other-
wise, the project is continued, which occurs with probability 1−F (R∗), and the expected
investment return conditional on continuation is E[r|r > R∗] = r¯ + f(R∗)
α(1−F (R∗)) .
A lower withdrawal threshold improves expected utility as it implies a smaller area
of ineﬃcient withdrawals by reducing the extent of coordination failure (∂EUn/∂R∗ <
0), as derived in Appendix 2.7.2. This highlights the beneﬁcial role of liquidity in the
equilibrium with liquidation: more liquidity reduces coordination failure and therefore
the withdrawal threshold, thereby indirectly improving the expected utility of an investor:
∂EUn
∂R∗
∂R∗
∂yn
> 0
There is also a detrimental role of liquidity. As the ex-ante opportunity cost of liquidity
is the foregone higher expected investment return, holding more liquidity is costly. This
is further exacerbated by optimal liquidation, shielding the investor from particularly
18This which can be generalized to any fraction p ∈ [0, 1].
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adverse outcomes of the project. The direct eﬀect of liquidity is:
∂EUn
∂yn
= −(1− F (R∗)) (E[r|r ≥ R∗]− 1) < 0
In case of continuation, which occurs with probability 1 − F (R∗), the expected invest-
ment return conditional on continuation exceeds the unit return to liquidity. In case of
liquidation, which occurs with probability F (R∗), the project and liquidity both yield a
unit return.
The bank balances the beneﬁcial and detrimental eﬀects of liquidity. It takes the
response of investors at the interim date R∗(yn, y−n) into account and the other bank’s
choice of liquidity y−n as given. The optimal liquidity choice of bank n solves the following
problem:
y∗n(y−n) ≡ argmax
yn
EUn(yn, y−n) s.t. R∗ = R∗(yn, y−n) (2.13)
where the best response function y∗n(y−n) is determined by the ﬁrst-order condition:
dEUn
dyn
=
∂EUn
∂yn
+
∂EUn
∂R∗n
∂R∗n
∂yn
= 0 (2.14)
χ(1− yn)(R∗ − 1)f(R∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal benefits from liquidity
= [1− F (R∗)]
(
1
α
f(R∗)
1− F (R∗) + r¯ − 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal (opportunity) costs of liquidity
I derive conditions on the expected investment return to ensure the existence of a
unique best response function in Appendix 2.7.3. First, an upper bound on the expected
investment return r¯H ensures that the ﬁrst-order condition has a solution for any feasible
liquidity choice of the other bank. Second, a lower bound on the investment return r¯L
ensures that liquidity is indeed scarce as supposed, again for any feasible liquidity choice
of the other bank. Finally, I show that the objective function EUn is globally concave
in the level of liquidity yn. Therefore, a unique solution y∗n(y−n) exists for any level of
liquidity held by the other bank.
There is strategic substitutability in liquidity holdings. If the other bank holds more
liquidity, the liquidation cost of a given bank is reduced for any given level of liquidity.
As holding liquidity is costly, the bank optimally reduces its liquidity level, free-riding on
the other bank’s liquidity. The other bank’s liquidity holding is only useful for partially
66 CHAPTER 2. BANK RUNS, LIQUIDITY, AND REGULATION
deterring a run since a potential liquidation cost is reduced, but not for serving investors
when they do withdraw. Thus, the reduction in liquidity is less than one-for-one:
dy∗n
dy−n
= − (R
∗ − 1) + χ(1− yn)[1 + α(R∗ − 1)(r¯ − R∗)]
2(R∗ − 1) + χ(1− yn)[1 + α(R∗ − 1)(r¯ − R∗)] ∈ (−1, 0) (2.15)
Since the slope of the best-response function lies strictly within the unit circle, is bounded
and symmetric, there exists a unique and symmetric level of liquidity held at each bank:
y∗n ≡ y∗. It is implicitly given by dEUndyn (y∗, y∗) = 0. Proposition 6 summarizes.
Proposition 6. Consider the overall game with systemic liquidation costs (d = 1),
vanishing private noise (γ → ∞), and an expected investment return within the range
(r¯L, r¯H). Suppose that the equilibrium with liquidation is selected if multiple equilibria
exist in the withdrawal subgame. Then, there exists a unique and symmetric equilibrium
in threshold strategies. It is characterized by a bank’s liquidity choice y∗A = y
∗
B ≡ y∗ ∈(
λ, 1+λ
2
)
at the initial date and withdrawal threshold of investors in the subgame that are
(implicitly) given by:
R∗ = 1 + χ(1 + λ− 2y∗) ∈ (1, r¯) (2.16)
χ(1− y∗)(R∗ − 1) = 1
α
+ (r¯ − 1)1− F (R
∗)
f(R∗)
(2.17)
The boundaries on the expected investment return are r¯L ≡ 1 + χ(1 − λ) and r¯H ≡
1 + f(1+0.5χ(1−λ))
1−F (1+0.5χ(1−λ)) [0.5χ
2(1− λ)2 − 1/α].
The equilibrium is characterised by partial free-riding on the respective other bank’s
liquidity.
2.4 Welfare
This section derives the liquidity choice of a social planner and compares it to the bank’s
optimal portfolio choice. As in Lorenzoni (2008), I adopt the notion of constrained eﬃ-
ciency: the social planner chooses the levels of liquidity but takes the optimal withdrawal
decision of investors at the interim date as given. A direct choice of the threshold would
achieve the ﬁrst-best allocation (R∗n = 1). In contrast to a bank, the planner internal-
izes the beneﬁcial eﬀects of liquidity for another bank’s investors (system-wide eﬀects of
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liquidity). Therefore, the constrained planner can be thought of as a macro-prudential
authority.
The constrained socially efficient levels of liquidity (ySPA , y
SP
B ) solve the planner’s
portfolio choice problem at the initial date, taking investors’ responses at the interim
date R∗n(yA, yB) into account:
(ySPA , y
SP
B ) ≡ arg max
yA,yB
SWF ≡ EUA + EUB s.t. R∗A(yA, yB) = R∗B(yA, yB) (2.18)
The ﬁrst-order condition for the social planner’s problem is:
0 =
dSWF
dyn
=
∂EUn
∂yn
+
∂EUn
∂R∗n
∂R∗n
∂yn
+
∂EU−n
∂R∗−n
∂R∗−n
∂yn
(2.19)
χ(1− yA + 1− yB)(R∗ − 1)f(R∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
social marginal benefits from liquidity
= [1− F (R∗n)]
(
1
α
f(R∗n)
1− F (R∗) + r¯ − 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
social marginal costs of liquidity
The planner balances the social marginal cost of liquidity in terms of foregone in-
vestment return conditional on continuation (∂EUn/∂yn < 0) with the social marginal
beneﬁts from liquidity in terms of lower withdrawal thresholds. The private and social
marginal costs of liquidity coincide, while the social marginal beneﬁts from liquidity ex-
ceed the private marginal beneﬁt. Apart from the beneﬁcial eﬀect of liquidity on the
investors of one bank (∂R∗n/∂yn < 0), which is identical to the private beneﬁt from liq-
uidity, the planner also considers the beneﬁcial eﬀect of liquidity on the other bank’s
investors (∂R∗−n/∂yn < 0). Recall that more liquidity allows to serve more withdraw-
ing investors and therefore avoids costly liquidation for a given number of withdrawals,
thereby mitigating the coordination failure between investors.
The optimization problem is fully symmetric. There is full substitutability between
liquidity held at one bank and that held at another to reduce the withdrawal threshold
RSPn = R
SP = 1 + χ[1 + λ − ySPA − ySPB ]. Furthermore, both ﬁrst-order conditions yield
the same condition (equation 2.19). Therefore, only the total amount of liquidity is
determined ySPtotal ≡ ySPA + ySPB .
I derive conditions on the expected investment return to ensure the existence of
a unique constraint eﬃcient liquidity level. First, the upper bound on the expected
investment return changes relative to the bank’s portfolio choice, and the following upper
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bound on the investment return is now required:
r¯H < r¯
SP
H ≡ 1 +
(
2χ2(1− λ)2 − 1
α
)
f(1 + χ(1− λ))
1− F (1 + χ(1− λ)) (2.20)
which is strictly below the upper bound of 1 + 2χ implied by no-dominance. Second,
the upper bound ytotal → 2y¯ is never optimal. Finally, the global concavity of the social
welfare function in the total amount of liquidity is established in Appendix (2.7.4) for
which the no-dominance bound on the expected investment return suﬃces. Taking these
points together, there exists a unique level of total liquidity ySPtotal that maximizes social
welfare and is implicitly given by dSWF
dyn
(ySPtotal) = 0.
Proposition 7 summarizes and compares the total amount of liquidity held by a
planner with the total amount of liquidity held by banks:
Proposition 7. Consider the overall game with systemic liquidation costs (d = 1),
vanishing private noise (γ → ∞), and an expected investment return r¯ < r¯SPH ≡ 1 +(
2χ2(1− λ)2 − 1
α
)
f(1+χ(1−λ))
1−F (1+χ(1−λ)) . A macro-prudential authority, the constrained social
planner, chooses the liquidity level and investors respond optimally as before. Then, there
exists a unique level of total liquidity ySPtotal that maximizes social welfare and is implicitly
given by:
χ(2− ySPtotal)(RSP − 1) =
(
1
α
+ [r¯ − 1]1− F (R
SP )
f(RSP )
)
(2.21)
where RSP = 1 + χ[1 + λ− ySPtotal] is the withdrawal threshold of investors at either bank.
A macro-prudential authority holds more liquidity than the private banking system:
ySPtotal > y
∗
A + y
∗
B (2.22)
Proof. The higher level of liquidity held by a macro-prudential authority remains to be
proven. Relative to the bank’s ﬁrst-order condition, the right-hand side of the social plan-
ner’s ﬁrst-order condition (2.19) has an additional positive term, the positive externality
of liquidity in terms of reducing the other bank’s withdrawal threshold. Thus, the social
beneﬁts from liquidity exceed the social cost of liquidity when evaluated at the optimal
level y∗A = y
∗
b = y
∗:
dSWF
dyn
∣∣∣∣
yn=y−n=y∗
> 0 (2.23)
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Given the strict global concavity of the objective function in the total amount of liquidity
ytotal, the planner’s total amount of liquidity must be higher (ySPtotal > y
∗
A + y
∗
B), thereby
internalising the positive system-wide externality of liquidity.
The diﬀerence between the constraint eﬃcient and the optimal level of liquidity
is interpreted as a macro-prudential liquidity buffer. A constrained planner, such as a
macro-prudential authority, takes all economy-wide eﬀects into account by holding more
liquidity, internalising the social costs of liquidation that arise in the presence of systemic
liquidation cost.
2.5 Comparative Statics
This sections studies how the equilibrium allocation y∗ and the planner’s allocation ySPtotal
vary with the exogenous parameters of the model. Parameters of interest are the liqui-
dation cost parameter χ, the expected investment return r¯, and the proportion of early
investors λ. Proposition 8 summarizes the results.
Proposition 8. The private and social levels of liquidity vary according to
(a) ∂y
∗
∂χ
> 0 and
∂ySP
total
∂χ
> 0 such that a higher liquidation cost raises the liquidity
held privately and socially;
(b) ∂y
∗
∂r¯
< 0 and
∂ySP
total
∂r¯
< 0 such that a higher investment return lowers the private
and social levels of liquidity;
(a) ∂y
∗
∂λ
> 0 and
∂ySP
total
∂λ
> 0 such that a larger proportion of early investors induces
higher liquidity holdings.
See Appendix 2.7.5 for a proof. The intuition underlying these results is as follows.
First, a larger proportion of early investors increases the liquidity held privately and
socially. Since early investors wish to consume at the interim date and always withdraw,
more liquidity is held to serve them.
Second, the strength of the liquidation cost is captured by the liquidation cost
parameter χ. It aﬀects the beneﬁts from holding liquidity in terms of avoiding costly
liquidation in case of elevated withdrawals, thereby reducing the withdrawal threshold.
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Thus, if liquidation is more costly, such as in times of ﬁnancial distress, then liquidity is
particularly valuable and more liquidity is held both privately and socially.
Third, a higher expected investment return r¯ aﬀects the ex-ante opportunity cost
of holding liquidity. Therefore, both banks and the planner hold more liquidity when
the project pays a better return on average. Note that there is no eﬀect of the expected
investment return on the withdrawal threshold R∗n as private noise vanishes. However, if
the private noise is bounded (γ < γ < ∞), a higher investment return also reduces the
run threshold. This second eﬀect would further reduce the level of liquidity held.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper examined the role of liquidity in an economy with many banks subject to
runs and systemic liquidation costs. I showed that the presence of liquidity, which drives
a wedge between the amount of withdrawals and the liquidation volume, restores mul-
tiple equilibria – even if a global game reﬁnement is used. Apart from the usual equi-
librium with liquidation (Morris and Shin (2000); Goldstein and Pauzner (2005)), a no-
liquidation equilibrium exists for a range of economic conditions. Furthermore, systemic
liquidation costs imply that one bank’s liquidity holding reduces the liquidation costs of
other banks. The positive implication is the partial substitutability of private liquidity
holdings as banks free-ride on the liquidity holdings of other banks. The normative im-
plication is that banks hold insuﬃcient liquidity relative to the average liquidity holding
of a constrained planner. Since a planner internalizes the system-wide eﬀects of liquidity,
I interpret the planner as a macro-prudential authority.
This framework provides a natural laboratory for studying macro-prudential poli-
cies in a micro-founded setting more generally. I abstracted from capital requirements,
diversiﬁcation, and taxes on withdrawals in this paper, but analyze some of these in other
work. There are other elements relevant to the conduct of macro-prudential regulation
omitted in this framework, such as limited liability, ’too big to fail’, and perverse in-
centives arising from incentive schemes. These are all exciting avenues for subsequent
research.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Posterior distributions
Investment return The posterior mean of the investment project return is a weighted
average of the mean of the prior distribution and the private signal, in which the relative
weights are given by the respective precisions. The precision of the posterior distribution
is the sum of the precisions of the prior and the signal. Normality is preserved:
R
n
i ∼ N
(
αr¯ + γxi
α + γ
,
1
α + γ
)
(2.24)
The ratio of the precision of the prior (public signal) relative to the private signal, α
γ
,
determines the extent to which the posterior mean depends on the private signal. The
more precise the private signal relatively to the prior, the more the posterior is determined
by the private signal. In the limit of vanishing private noise (α
γ
→ 0 as γ → ∞), the
posterior mean converges to the private signal.
Proportion of prematurely withdrawing late investors at bank n Using the
deﬁnition of the proportion of withdrawing investors, the posterior distribution of the
mean, and a law of large numbers, the posterior proportion of withdrawing late investors
at a given investor’s bank W ni,n can be written as:
W ni,n = (1− λ)Φ
(√
δ [R∗n − r¯] +
√
γ(α + γ)
α + 2γ
[R∗n − Rni ]
)
(2.25)
δ ≡ α
2(α + γ)
γ(α+ 2γ)
(2.26)
where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution
and δ summarizes precision parameters. A late investor that receives the threshold signal
xi = x
∗
n thus forms the following posterior mean of the proportion of withdrawing late
investors at his bank:
(W nn )
∗ ≡ W ni,n
∣∣
xi=x∗n
= (1− λ)Φ(z1n) (2.27)
z1n ≡
√
δ [R∗n − r¯] (2.28)
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If the private noise vanishes (γ →∞), then δ → 0 and (W nn )∗ → 1−λ2 .
Proportion of prematurely withdrawing late investors at bank −n Withdrawal
thresholds may diﬀer across banks. Depending on the other bank’s threshold R∗−n, an
investors at bank n expects the following proportion of withdrawing late investors at bank
−n:
W ni,−n = (1− λ)Φ
(√
δ
[
R∗−n − r¯
]
+
√
γ(α + γ)
α + 2γ
[
R∗−n − Rni
])
(2.29)(
W n−n
)∗ ≡ W ni,−n∣∣xi=x∗n = (1− λ)Φ(z2n) (2.30)
z2n ≡
√
δ
[
R∗−n − r¯
]
+
√
δ
γ
α
[
R∗−n − R∗n
]
(2.31)
2.7.2 Derivation of expected utility EUn
When private noise vanishes (γ → ∞), equilibrium withdrawals by late investors at the
interim date are:
w∗n(r) = (1− λ)Φ
(
α√
γ
[R∗n − r¯] +
√
γ[R∗n − r]
)
→

0 r > R∗n
1−λ
2
if r = R∗n
1− λ r < R∗n
(2.32)
Therefore, there is no liquidation if the project return is above the threshold R∗n, while
the investment project is completely liquidated if the investment return is below the
threshold. Late investors receive the continuation payoﬀ c2n in the former case and unity
in the latter. Early investors always receive unity as promised. Adding these components
up, the expected utility is:
EUn(yn, y−n) =
∫ R∗n
−∞
1 · 1dF (r) +
∫ ∞
R∗n
λ · 1 + (1− λ) · yn − λ+ (1− yn)r
1− λ dF (r)(2.33)
= yn + (1− yn)
[
F (R∗n) · 1 + (1− F (R∗n)) ·
(
r¯ +
f(R∗n)
α(1− F (R∗n))
)]
(2.34)
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The partial derivatives are:
∂EUn
∂yn
= −(1 − F (R∗n)) (E[r|r ≥ R∗n]− 1) < 0 (2.35)
∂EUn
∂R∗n
= −(1 − yn)(R∗n − 1)f(R∗n) < 0 (2.36)
∂2EUn
∂y2n
=
∂EUn
∂y−n
= 0 (2.37)
∂2EUn
∂yn∂R∗n
= (R∗n − 1)f(R∗n) > 0 (2.38)
∂2EUn
∂(R∗n)
2
= −(1 − yn)f(R∗n)[1 + α(R∗n − 1)(r¯ −R∗n)] < 0 (2.39)
where the signs are implied by the ordering 1 < R∗n < r¯ (Lemma 6).
2.7.3 Unique best response y∗n(y−n)
Let Λ(R∗) ≡ 1−F (R∗)
f(R∗)
> 0 and therefore Λ′(R∗) = −√α − α(r¯ − R∗)Λ(R∗) < 0. The
ﬁrst-order condition becomes:
χ2(1− y∗n)(1 + λ− y∗n − y−n) =
1
α
+ (r¯ − 1)Λ(R∗n) (2.40)
where R∗n = 1+χ(1+λ−y∗n−y−n). Note that the left-hand side (LHS) of equation (2.40)
is decreasing in the liquidity level y∗n, while the right-hand side (RHS) is increasing in it.
First, existence of equilibrium requires that the LHS exceeds the RHS when evalu-
ated at the lower bound y∗n → λ for any liquidity level y−n. This inequality is hardest to
satisfy for y−n → y¯ ≡ 1+λ2 . Rewriting yields an upper bound on the expected investment
return:
r¯ < r¯H ≡ 1 +
χ2(1−λ)2
2
− 1
α
Λ(1 + 0.5χ(1− λ)) (2.41)
This upper bound is strictly below the level of 1 + 2χ as implied by no dominance and
replaces this upper bound.
Second, the supposed scarcity of liquidity requires that the marginal cost of liquid-
ity just exceeds its marginal beneﬁt as the liquidity level converges its upper bound y¯.
Therefore: LHS(y∗n → y¯) < RHS(y∗n → y¯) for any liquidity level y−n. This inequal-
ity is hardest to satisfy for y−n → λ. Rewriting yields a lower bound on the expected
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investment return:
r¯ > r¯′L ≡ 1 +
χ2(1−λ)2
4
− 1
α
Λ(1 + 0.5χ(1− λ)) < r¯H (2.42)
As a consequence of the no-dominance constraint, this lower bound is strictly below the
level of r¯L = 1 + χ(1 − λ), which ensures R∗n < r¯. Therefore, the lower bound of r¯L is
maintained. Note that y∗n 6= y¯ implies y∗n < y¯ by the global concavity of the objective
function, which can be seen by the sign of the second-order derivative of the objective
function:
d2EUn
dy2n
=
∂R∗n
∂yn
[
2
∂2EUn
∂yn∂R∗n
+
∂2EUn
∂(R∗n)
2
∂R∗n
∂yn
]
+
∂EUn
∂R∗n
∂2R∗n
∂y2n
< 0
where ∂
2R∗n
∂y2n
= 0 and the sign follows directly from the previously established signs on the
partial derivatives of the withdrawal threshold R∗n and the expected utility EUn.
2.7.4 Global concavity of SWF
Consider the second derivative of the social welfare function:
d2SWF
d(ySP )2
= −χf(R∗)[√α(r¯−1)+χ(3+λ−ytotal)−(r¯−R∗)(1−αχ2(1+λ−ytotal(2−ytotal)))] < 0
The highest possible values is reached when α → 0 and ytotal → 2y¯. Then, the second-
order derivative is still negative as 1 + 2χ > r¯ by no-dominance. Therefore, the second-
order derivative is always negative, establishing global concavity of the social welfare
function.
2.7.5 Comparative statics
Privately optimal liquidity level y∗
Parameters of interest are χ, r¯, λ. The eﬀect of parameters on the withdrawal threshold
R∗ = 1 + χ(1 + λ− 2y∗) is:
∂R∗
∂χ
= (1 + λ− 2y∗) > 0 (2.43)
∂R∗
∂r¯
= 0 (2.44)
∂R∗
∂λ
= χ > 0 (2.45)
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The ﬁrst-order condition for the private level of liquidity y∗ can be written asG(a, R∗, y∗) =
0, where a ∈ {χ, r¯, λ} is a parameter:
G(a, R∗, y∗) = (r − 1)1− F (R
∗)
f(R∗)
+
1
α
− χ2(1− y∗)(1 + λ− 2y∗) (2.46)
Then, the eﬀect of a parameter on the equilibrium liquidity level is given by dy
∗
da
= −∂G/∂a
∂G/∂y
.
Note that:
∂G
∂y∗
= −2χ(r¯ − 1)Λ′(R∗) + χ2(3 + λ− 4y∗) > 0 (2.47)
∂G
∂r¯
= (r¯ − 1)[√α + (r¯ − R∗)Λ(R∗)] + Λ(R∗) > 0 (2.48)
∂G
∂χ
= (r¯ − 1)(1 + λ− 2y∗)Λ′(R∗)− 2χ(1− y∗)(1 + λ− 2y∗) < 0 (2.49)
∂G
∂λ
= −χ2(1− y∗) + χ(r¯ − 1)Λ′(R∗) < 0 (2.50)
Therefore, the partial derivatives of the privately held liquidity levels have the signs as
claimed.
Socially efficient liquidity level ySPtotal
The eﬀect of parameters on the withdrawal threshold RSP = 1 + χ(1 + λ− ySPtotal) is:
∂RSP
∂χ
= (1 + λ− ySPtotal) > 0 (2.51)
∂RSP
∂r¯
= 0 (2.52)
∂RSP
∂λ
= χ > 0 (2.53)
The ﬁrst-order condition for the social level of liquidity ySPtotal can be written as G˜(a, R
SP , ySP ) =
0, where a ∈ {χ, r¯, λ} is a parameter:
G˜(a, RSP , ySPtotal) = (r − 1)
1− F (R∗)
f(R∗)
+
1
α
− χ2(2− ySPtotal)(1 + λ− ySPtotal) (2.54)
Then, the eﬀect of a parameter on the equilibrium liquidity level is given by dy
SP
total
da
=
−∂G˜/∂a
∂G˜/∂y
. As above, partial diﬀerentiation of G˜ proves the signs on the comparative statics
of the total level of liquidity held by the planner as claimed.
76 CHAPTER 2. BANK RUNS, LIQUIDITY, AND REGULATION
Chapter 3
Information contagion and systemic
risk
Information contagion can reduce systemic risk defined as the joint default probability
of banks. This paper examines the effects of ex-post information contagion on both the
banks’ ex-ante optimal portfolio choices and the implied welfare losses due to joint default.
Because of counterparty risk and common exposures, bad news about one bank reveals
valuable information about another bank, thereby triggering information contagion. We
find that information contagion reduces (increases) the joint default probability when banks
are subject to counterparty risk (common exposures). When applied to microfinance, our
model also provides a novel explanation for higher repayment rates in group lending.
JEL Classifications: G01, G21, O16
Keywords: information contagion, counterparty risk, common exposure, systemic
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3.1 Introduction
Systemic risk is deﬁned as the joint default of a substantial part of the ﬁnancial system
and is associated with large social costs.1 One major source of systemic risk is infor-
mation contagion: when investors are sensitive to news about the health of the ﬁnancial
system, bad news about one ﬁnancial institution can adversely spill over to other ﬁnancial
institutions. For instance, the insolvency of one money market mutual fund with a large
exposure to the investment bank Lehman Brothers spurred investor fears and led to a
wide-spread run on all money market mutual funds in September 2008.2 As information
contagion aﬀects various ﬁnancial institutions including commercial banks, money mar-
ket mutual funds, and shadow banks, we adopt a broad notion of ﬁnancial intermediaries
called banks for short.
There are at least two reasons for an investor of a bank to ﬁnd information about
another bank’s proﬁtability valuable. On the one hand, the ﬁrst bank may have lent
to the second bank in the past, for example to share liquidity risk as in Allen and Gale
(2000). Learning about the debtor bank’s proﬁtability then helps the investor assess the
counterparty risk of the creditor bank. On the other hand, both banks may have some
common exposure to an asset class, such as risky sovereign debt or mortgage-backed
securities. Learning about another bank’s proﬁtability then helps the investor assess the
proﬁtability of its bank.3
We develop a model of systemic risk with information contagion. Our model features
two banks, where systemic risk refers to the ex-ante probability of joint default. Due to
both counterparty risk and common exposures, bad news about one bank can trigger the
default of another bank. Information contagion in this setup is the amount of a bank’s
additional ﬁnancial fragility caused by such bad news. We examine the eﬀects of ex-post
information contagion on the ex-ante optimal portfolio choice of a bank and the implied
level of systemic risk.
1BCBS (1997) compares the cost of systemic bank crises in various developing and industrialized
countries and document the range from about 3% of GDP for the savings and loan crisis in the United
States to about 30% of GDP for the 1981-87 crisis in Chile.
2Lehman Brothers failed on September 15, 2008 and the share price of the Reserve Primary Fund
dropped below the critical value of 1$ on September 16, 2008.
3For example, the funding cost of one bank increases after adverse news about another bank because
of correlated loan portfolio returns in Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008b).
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Our ﬁrst result refers to information contagion due to counterparty risk. When
information spillover is unanticipated, that is it occurs with zero probability, the ex-
ante optimal portfolio is unchanged and systemic risk increases (lemma 7). By contrast,
anticipated information spillover makes the ex-ante portfolio choice more prudent to
counteract ex-post information. Banks expose themselves less to counterparty risk by
engaging in less liquidity co-insurance and hold more liquidity themselves. This reduces
systemic risk (Result 1) and is labelled as a resilience effect. The direct detrimental eﬀect
of information contagion on systemic risk is more than fully compensated by an indirect
beneﬁcial eﬀect via the ex-ante portfolio choice. Overall, systemic risk in the ﬁnancial
system is reduced once information spillover that give rise to information contagion is
present.
We also analyze information contagion due to common exposures. When informa-
tion spillover is unanticipated, systemic risk again increases (lemma 8) similar to lemma
7. When information spillover is anticipated, however, systemic risk increases (Result 2),
which is labelled the instability effect. Taking these results together, the consequences
of information contagion for the level of systemic risk (via changes of the ex-ante opti-
mal portfolio choice) depend on the nature of the interbank linkage: ﬁnancial fragility
increases (decreases) when banks are linked via common exposure (counterparty risk).
Our main contribution is the analysis of information contagion due to counterparty
risk and its eﬀects on the ex-ante optimal portfolio choice and systemic risk. Counterparty
risk as a source of information contagion and its consequences for the ex-ante portfolio
choice have not been consistently studied before.4 Our counterparty risk mechanism
builds on the literature of ﬁnancial contagion due to balance sheet linkages. Building
on Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Allen and Gale (2000) describe ﬁnancial contagion as
an equilibrium result.5 Interbank lending insures banks against a non-aggregate liquid-
ity shock and potentially achieves the ﬁrst-best outcome. However, a zero-probability
aggregate liquidity shock may travel through the entire ﬁnancial system. While counter-
party risk in our model also arises from the potential default on interbank obligations,
we obtain the ex-ante optimal portfolio choice given that contagion may occur with pos-
4Cooper and Ross (1998) and Ennis and Keister (2006) study the effect of ex-post individual bank
runs on the ex-ante liquidity choice and the design of deposit contracts. By contrast, we analyze how
information contagion due to counterparty risk affects the ex-ante portfolio choice and deposit contract
design of banks and examine the consequences for the joint default probability of banks.
5Freixas et al. (2000) consider spatial instead of intertemporal uncertainty about liquidity needs.
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itive probability.6 Dasgupta (2004) also demonstrates the presence of ﬁnancial contagion
with positive probability in the unique equilibrium of a global game version of the model
described by Allen and Gale (2000), focusing on the coordination failure initiated by ad-
verse information. By contrast, we analyse the impact of information contagion from
counterparty risk on the ex-ante portfolio choice of ﬁnancial intermediaries, which is only
partially addressed in Dasgupta (2004). Furthermore, our focus is on the consequences
for systemic risk and we also analyse the role of common exposures.
Our results also relate to the literature on information contagion due to common
exposures. Information about the solvency of one bank is an informative signal about
the health of other banks with similar exposure in Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008b).7
The anticipation of ex-post information contagion induces banks to correlate their ex-
ante investment decisions, endogenously creating common exposures. By contrast, we
consider counterparty risk as a principal source of information contagion. We also allow
for a larger set of portfolio choice options.8 Leitner (2005) analyzes the ex-ante beneﬁcial
insurance eﬀects of ex-post ﬁnancial contagion in the absence of an explicit ex-ante risk
sharing mechanism due to limited commitment. By contrast, we focus on the ex-ante
eﬀects of ex-post information contagion in a model with commitment. Allen et al. (2012)
analyze systemic risk stemming from the interaction of common exposures and funding
maturity through an information channel.9 However, our focus is on the novel analysis of
counterparty risk as a source of information contagion and its repercussions for systemic
risk.10
6Postlewaite and Vives (1987) show the uniqueness of equilibrium with positive probability of bank
runs in a Diamond and Dybvig (1983) setup with demand deposit contracts and four periods. By con-
trast, we analyse the impact of information contagion from counterparty risk and common exposures on
the ex-ante optimal portfolio choice and the implied level of systemic risk.
7Other models of common exposure include Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008a), who analyze the in-
terplay between government bail-out policies and banks’ incentives to correlate their investments. Chen
(1999) shows that bank runs can be triggered by information about bank defaults when banks have a
common exposure. Uninformed investors use the publicly available signal about the default of another
bank to assess the default probability of their bank. An early model of information-based individual
fragility is Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988).
8While interconnectedness of banks only arises through the endogenous choice of correlated invest-
ments in Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008b), we maintain the exogenous correlation of the bank’s invest-
ment returns as in Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008a) but endogenize liquidity holdings, interbank liquid-
ity insurance (co-insurance as in Brusco and Castiglionesi (2007)), and insurance of impatient investors
against idiosyncratic liquidity shocks.
9Banks swap risky investment projects to diversify, generating different types of portfolio overlaps.
Investors receive a signal about the solvency of all banks at the final date. Upon the arrival of bad news
about aggregate solvency, roll-over of short-term debt occurs less often when assets are clustered, leading
to larger systemic risk.
10Furthermore, we consider an investment allocation between a safe and a risky asset and information
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Our results on the interaction of information spillovers and counterparty risk are not
limited to systemic risk in banking of advanced economies. Counterparty risk also arises
from joint liability in group lending contracts commonly used by the Grameen bank
and other microﬁnance institutions in developing economies (see e.g. Stiglitz (1990),
Varian (1990), or Morduch (1999)). The idea behind group borrowing is to employ peer
monitoring to overcome asymmetric information. Thus, borrowers in a group will know
each other quite well (either neighbors from the same village, or even family members)
and information spillover occurs frequently. In particular, our resilience eﬀect predicts
that (i) group loans have a higher repayment rate than individual loans and (ii) group
borrowers hold more liquid assets. As described in section 3.5, these predictions are
veriﬁed in the empirical microﬁnance literature.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. The model is described in section 3.2
and its equilibrium is analyzed in section 3.3, including a discussion of special limiting
cases that provide further intuition to our model. We present our results in section 3.4,
which also contains extensive robustness checks. Our model is applied to microﬁnance in
section 3.5, providing a novel explanation for empirical ﬁndings in that literature. Finally,
section 3.6 concludes. Derivations, proofs, and tables are found in appendices 3.7, 3.8,
and 3.9.
3.2 Model
The economy extends over three dates labelled as initial (t = 0), interim (t = 1), and
ﬁnal (t = 2) and consists of two regions (k = A,B) interpreted as geographic regions
or asset classes. Each region is inhabited by a bank and a unit continuum of investors.
Our notion of ﬁnancial intermediation is broad, capturing both the traditional case of
retail investors at commercial banks and institutional investors at money market mutual
funds.11 There is a single physical good used for consumption and investment. The focus
of this paper is on systemic risk measured by the probability of the joint failure of banks
at the initial date.
spillover about bank-specific solvency.
11In the language of Uhlig (2010), our banks corresponds to core banks, while our investors correspond
to local banks.
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Inhabitants of each region have access to two investment opportunities at the initial
date. First, storage produces one unit at the following date per unit invested. Second,
a risky regional investment project matures at the ﬁnal date and produces a stochastic
output Rk that exceeds the output from storage in expectation (E[Rk] > 1), where E is
the expectation operator. Liquidation of the project at the interim is costly, producing an
inferior output β ∈ (0, 1) only. Since the recovery rate is positive, liquidation is optimal if
the realized output is known to be low. We adopt a bivariate speciﬁcation of the project
output:
Rk =
 R w.p. θk0 w.p. 1− θk (3.1)
where R > 2 and the regional fundamental is uniformly distributed (θk ∼ U [0, 1]) and
interpreted as a regional solvency shock. Let corr(θA, θB) denote the correlation between
the regional fundamentals, where corr(θA, θB) = 1 refers to a common exposure. Despite
common exposure, the realised regional project outputs can diﬀer because of the individ-
ual randomness of each project. We abstract from portfolio diversiﬁcation motivated by
limits to monitoring, for instance.
As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), investors learn their liquidity preference pri-
vately at the interim date. Early investors wish to consume at the interim date, while
late investors wish to consume at the ﬁnal date. The ex-ante probability of being an
early investor λ ∈ (0, 1) is identical across investors and equals the regional proportion
of early investors by a law of large numbers. The investor’s period utility function u(c)
is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave and satisﬁes the
Inada conditions. Thus, the expected utility of an investor is:
Eλ[U(c1, c2)] = λu(c1) + (1− λ)u(c2) (3.2)
where ct is the investor’s consumption at date t. Investors in each region are endowed
with one unit at the initial date to be invested or deposited at their regional bank.
The role for banks in our model is the traditional provider of liquidity insurance
(Diamond and Dybvig (1983)), which arises from the smaller volatility of regional liquid-
ity demand than individual liquidity demand. Banks oﬀer demand deposit contracts that
specify withdrawals (d1, d2) if funds are withdrawn at the interim or ﬁnal date, where we
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set d2 ≡ ∞ without loss of generality.12 Bank pay an equal amount to all withdrawing
investors (pro-rata) in case of default. There is free entry to the banking sector, ensuring
that each bank maximizes the expected utility of a representative investor.13 Investors
deposit in full since their interest is fully aligned with their bank’s.
A bank is illiquid if a suﬃciently large proportion of late investors withdraws and
the project has to be partially liquidated. A bank is insolvent if a yet larger proportion
of late investors withdraws and the full liquidation of the project does not suﬃce to serve
them. An important insight of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) is that the strategic comple-
mentarity in investors’ withdrawal decisions generates multiple equilibria, of which the
ineﬃcient one features a bank run. We focus on essential bank runs as in Allen and Gale
(2007), however, whereby a run takes place only if it is unavoidable. That is, the no-run
equilibrium is selected if multiple equilibria exist. Let ak be the default probability of an
individual bank and A ≡ aAaB be the probability of joint default, which is our measure
of systemic risk.
Counterparty risk is introduced via interbank insurance as in Allen and Gale (2000)
because of negatively correlated regional liquidity demand. A region has low liquidity
demand (λL ≡ λ − η) or high liquidity demand (λH ≡ λ + η) with equal probability,
where η > 0 is the size of the regional liquidity shock.14 To exclude bank runs merely
driven by aggregate liquidity shortage, we study negatively correlated liquidity shocks of
equal size:
probability region A region B
1
2
λA = λ+ η λB = λ− η
1
2
λA = λ− η λB = λ+ η
At the initial date banks agree on mutual liquidity insurance interpreted as mutual lines
of credit or cross-holding of deposits.15 The bank with high liquidity demand receives an
amount b ≥ 0 from the bank with low liquidity demand at the beginning of the interim
date. Repayment with interest (φ ≥ 1) takes place at the ﬁnal date if the debtor bank is
12Since the liquidity preference of an individual investor is private knowledge, the deposit contract
between the bank and the investor cannot be contingent on it.
13See also Gale (2010).
14Freixas et al. (2000) motivate interbank insurance by allowing for interregional travel of investors
who learn the location of their liquidity demand at the beginning of the first period.
15Since banks are symmetric at the initial date, they wish to exchange the same amount of deposits.
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solvent. A solvent debtor bank repays the creditor bank even if the latter is insolvent.16
We make the common assumption of seniority of interbank loans at the ﬁnal date only.17
Non-defaulted interbank claims can be liquidated at rate β.
There is strategic interaction between banks in their portfolio choices. At the initial
date banks simultaneously choose the amount of investment in the project 1 − yk, the
demand deposit contract, and agree on the volume of interbank insurance. A bank’s
portfolio choice aﬀects its solvency threshold θ¯k below which an essential bank run occurs.
Furthermore, it aﬀects another bank’s solvency threshold θ¯−k due to counterparty risk
and information contagion at the interim date. The optimal portfolio choices of banks at
the initial date are determined as a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Turning to the information structure of the model, all prior distributions are com-
mon knowledge. Before making their withdrawal decision at the interim date, investors
may receive independent signals about the success probabilities (θA, θB) with probability
(qA, qB). Therefore, investors may receive no, one or two signals. If a signal is received, it
perfectly reveals the regional success probability to the investor. If no signal is received,
nothing is learnt.
Information spillover occurs if investors of one bank learn about the solvency of
another bank. Such information is valuable to investors for two reasons. In case of
common exposure investment returns are correlated and the knowledge about one bank’s
solvency helps to predict another bank’s solvency. In case of counterparty risk, learning
about the debtor bank’s solvency helps investors predict the solvency of the creditor bank.
Information contagion occurs if investors run on a bank upon learning about another
bank’s solvency but would not have done so without the information. Our interest is
in analyzing the eﬀect of such information contagion at the interim date on the optimal
portfolio choice at the initial date and the implied systemic risk.
We close the description of the model by determining the investors’ payoﬀs. Starting
with the high liquidity demand or debtor region (H), the payoﬀs are independent of the
behavior in the low liquidity demand region. If the bank is insolvent, all funds are
liquidated and the interbank loan is defaulted upon. The impatient investor’s payoﬀ is
16We assume the existence of a liquidator of the creditor bank to which the solvent debtor bank repays
its debt at the final date. This assumption is natural as the liquidation of banks does not destroy value
because of claims on viable institutions.
17See, for example, Dasgupta (2004).
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dH ≡ y+(1−y)β+b. There are never partial runs since all bank runs are essential. If the
bank is liquid, no liquidation takes place and the interbank loan is repaid. The patient
investor’s payoﬀs is cG2H ≡ (1−y)R+y−λHd1−(φ−1)b1−λH in the good state and cB2H ≡
y−λHd1−(φ−1)b
1−λH
in the bad state. Superscripts (G,B) denote success (good state) and failure (bad state)
of the investment project and occur with probability 1− θH and θH , respectively.
The bank in the low liquidity demand or debtor region (L) pays b to the bank in the
high liquidity demand region at the interim date. In the case of a bank run in L, all assets
including the interbank claim are liquidated, yielding a payoﬀ y+(1−y)β−b+βφb˜. The
repayment of the interbank claim b˜ is uncertain: it yields b if H repays and zero otherwise.
The resulting payoﬀs are dNL ≡ y + (1 − y)β + (βφ − 1)b and dDL ≡ y + (1 − y)β − b.
Superscripts (N,D) denote survival and default of the bank in H . The liquidation value
of the interbank claim is positive in case of repayment only. Hence, patient investors
receive cGN2L ≡
(
(1−y)R+(y−λLd1)+(φ−1)b
1−λL
)
and cGD2L ≡
(
(1−y)R+(y−λLd1)−b
1−λL
)
in the good state
as well as cBN2L ≡
(
(y−λLd1)+(φ−1)b
1−λL
)
and cBD2L ≡
(
(y−λLd1)−b
1−λL
)
in the bad state.
Table (3.1) provides a timeline of the model.
Date 0 Date 1 Date 2
1. Endowed investors 1. Regional liquidity 1. Investment projects
invest or deposit shocks are publicly mature
at regional bank observed
2. Banks choose 2. Banks settle date-1 2. Banks settle date-2
portfolio and initiate interbank claims interbank claims
interbank deposits
3. Investors privately 3. Banks serve
observe liquidity remaining
preference withdrawals
4. Investors observe
regional solvency signals
5. Investors decide
whether to withdraw
Table 3.1: Timeline of the model.
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3.3 Equilibrium
In this section we compute the solvency thresholds below which investors withdraw from
their bank, causing an eﬃcient bank run. We also obtain the expected utility of investors
and the level of systemic risk for the cases of counterparty risk and common exposures.
Furthermore, we describe the derivation of the equilibrium allocations and consider several
limiting parameter values that yield a simple analytical solution to provide intuition for
our model.
3.3.1 Counterparty risk
Consider the case with counterparty risk (η > 0) and without common exposure (corr =
0). Suppose ﬁrst that no information spillovers occurs (investors receive no signal about
the solvency of the other bank), which we will relax below.
Start with the debtor bank (H) since the solvency threshold there is unaﬀected by
events at the creditor bank (L). With probability qH investors at the debtor bank are
informed and observe the realisation of the solvency shock θH . Because of essential bank
runs, all investors withdraw if and only if the expected utility from the stochastic ﬁnal-
date consumption θHu(cG2H) + (1 − θH)u(cB2H) falls short of the utility from their share
of the liquidated bank portfolio u(dH). Therefore, the solvency threshold at the debtor
bank θH is:
θH ≡ u(dH)− u(c
B
2H)
u(cG2H)− u(cB2H)
(3.3)
An essential bank run with full liquidation occurs if and only if θH < θH. Thus, the default
probability of the debtor bank if informed is also θH. With probability 1 − qH investors
are uninformed and base their eﬃcient withdrawal behaviour on the prior distributions.
We assume throughout that no bank runs occur without new information at the interim
date. That is, the prior is suﬃciently good as implied by a lower bound on the project
output in the good state (R ≥ R). Thus, the overall default probability of the debtor
bank is a1H ≡ qHθH. As shown in appendix 3.7, integrating the investors’ respective
payoﬀs over all possible signals yields the expected utility of investors at the debtor bank
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EUH :
EUH = (1− qH)
{
λHu(d1) + (1− λH)1
2
(u(cG2H) + u(c
B
2H))
}
(3.4)
+qH
{
θHu(dH) + (1− θH)
(
λHu(d1) + (1− λH)1
2
[
u(cG2H) + u(dH)
])}
which completes the description of the debtor region.
The creditor bank is aﬀected by a default of the debtor bank, both in terms of
the repayment at the ﬁnal date and the liquidation value of the interbank claim at the
interim date. If investors are informed, the solvency threshold θ1L is:
θ1L ≡ a1H[u(d
D
L )− u(cBD2L )] + (1− a1H)[u(dNL )− u(cBN2L )]
a1H[u(cGD2L )− u(cBD2L )] + (1− a1H)[u(cGN2L )− u(cBN2L )]
= θ1L(θH) (3.5)
and the overall default probability of the creditor bank is a1L ≡ qLθ1L.
Counterparty risk, the dependence of the creditor bank on the debtor bank, is
reﬂected by the solvency threshold θ1L(θH). A higher solvency threshold at the debtor
bank makes a default on the interbank claim more likely, thus raising the probability of
default at the creditor bank (∂θ1L
∂θH
> 0).18
As shown in appendix 3.7, the expected utility of investors in the creditor bank is:
EU1L = (1− qL)
{
λLu(d1) + (1− λL)1
2
(
(1− aH)
(
u(cGN2L ) + u(c
BN
2L )
)
(3.6)
+ aH
(
u(cGD2L ) + u(c
GN
2L )
) )}
+qL
{
θ1L
(
(1− aH)u(dNL ) + aHu(dDL )
)
+ λL(1− θ1L)u(d1)
+(1− λL)1
2
(
(1− θ21L)
(
(1− aH)u(cGN2L ) + aHu(cGD2L )
)
+(1− θ1L)2
(
(1− aH)u(cBN2L ) + aHu(cBD2L )
) )}
There is one main diﬀerence to the expected utility of investors at the debtor bank.
Since no information spillover takes place, the expectation over whether the debtor bank
18A failure of the debtor bank constitutes a negative externality on investors of the creditor bank.
Early investors at the creditor bank receive their share of the liquidation value dL instead of the higher
promised payment d1. Late investors are paid out fewer resources. Consequently, the solvency threshold
at the creditor bank strictly increases in the solvency threshold of the debtor bank.
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defaults, which occurs with probability aH , is taken.
Finally, the overall expected utility EUCR and the level of systemic risk ACR in the
case of counterparty risk (CR) are:
ACR ≡ a1La1H = qHqLθHθ1L (3.7)
EUCR ≡ 1
2
(EUH + EU1L) (3.8)
Since the regional solvency shocks are uncorrelated, the overall expected utility is the
average of the expected utility of an investor at the debtor and creditor bank, respectively.
This will be generalized once we allow for correlated solvency shocks.
We now allow for information spillover, that is news about the solvency of the
bank in the other region. The eﬃcient withdrawal behaviour of investors at the debtor
bank is unchanged and so is their expected utility EUH . By contrast, with probability
qH investors at the creditor bank are informed about the debtor bank’s solvency and
infer whether repayment at the ﬁnal date occurs and whether the liquidation of the
interbank claim yields revenue at the interim date.19 Consequently, there are two solvency
thresholds at the creditor bank: one if the debtor bank defaults (θ
D
2L) and one if the debtor
bank repays (θ
N
2L):
θ
N
2L ≡
u(dNL )− u(cBN2L )
u(cGN2L )− u(cBN2L )
(3.9)
θ
D
2L ≡
qH [u(d
D
L )− u(cBD2L )] + (1− qH)[u(dNL )− u(cBN2L )]
qH [u(cGD2L )− u(cBD2L )] + (1− qH)[u(cGN2L )− u(cBN2L )]
(3.10)
If the information spillover is unanticipated, the spillover of information at the interim
date has no eﬀect on the optimal portfolio choice at the initial date. Then, the solvency
thresholds can be ranked:
θ
N
2L < θ1L < θ
D
2L (3.11)
which captures both information contagion if the debtor bank defaults and stabilization
if the debtor bank repays the creditor bank.
19The creditor bank is not repaid if and only if investors at the debtor bank are informed and the
solvency of the debtor bank is low, which is a consequence of the seniority of interbank claims.
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The expected utility of an investor at the creditor bank EU2L changes to:
EU2L = (1− qL)
{
λLu(d1) + (1− λL)1
2
[
(1− aH)
(
u(cGN2L ) + u(c
BN
2L )
)
(3.12)
+aH
(
u(cGD2L ) + u(c
BD
2L )
) ]}
+qL
{(
θ
N
2L(1− aH)u(dNL ) + θ
D
2LaHu(d
D
L )
)
+λL
(
aH(1− θD2L) + (1− aH)(1− θ
N
2L)
)
u(d1)
+(1− λL)1
2
(
(1− aH)[(1− (θN2L)2)u(cGN2L ) + (1− θ
N
2L)
2u(cBN2L )]
+aH [(1− (θD2L)2)u(cGD2L ) + (1− θ
D
2L)
2u(cBD2L )]
)}
where the solvency thresholds in the creditor region now depend on whether the debtor
bank defaults. That is, the uninformed solvency threshold θ1L is replaced by the condi-
tional thresholds (θ
N
2L, θ
D
2L).
The overall expected utility of an investor EUCR+IC and the level of systemic risk
ACR+IC in case of counterparty risk and information contagion are:
EUCR+IC ≡ 1
2
(EUH + EU2L) (3.13)
ACR+IC = qHqLθHθ
D
2L (3.14)
which yields the following result:
Lemma 7. If information spillovers are unanticipated, then information contagion due
to counterparty risk unambiguously increases systemic risk:
ACR+IC > ACR (3.15)
3.3.2 Common exposure
Consider the case with common exposures (corr = 1) and no counterparty risk (η = 0).
Thus, the payoﬀs are symmetric across regions but investors are potentially asymmetri-
cally informed about the common solvency shock. Final-date consumption simpliﬁes to
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cG2 ≡ y−λd1+(1−y)R1−λ in the good state and cB2 ≡ y−λd11−λ in the bad state and the liquidation
payoﬀ to dβ ≡ y + (1− y)β. Again we start without information spillover. The solvency
threshold in either region becomes:
θ =
u(dβ)− u(cB2 )
u(cG2 )− u(cB2 )
(3.16)
where an eﬃcient bank run occurs if and only if the solvency level is below its threshold
(θ < θ). As derived in appendix 3.7, the expected utility in either region EUCE and the
level of systemic risk ACE in case of pure common exposure are:
EUCE =
qA + qB
2
[
θu(dβ) + (1− θ)
(
λu(d1) + (1− λ)1
2
[u(cG2 ) + u(dβ)]
)]
(3.17)
+
1− qA + 1− qB
2
[
λu(d1) + (1− λ)1
2
(u(cG2 ) + u(c
B
2 ))
]
ACE = qAqBθ (3.18)
We now allow for information spillover. While payoﬀs and the solvency threshold
are unchanged, the probability of being informed changes to qA + (1 − qA)qB > qA.
Naturally, information spillovers increases the probability of being informed. Therefore,
the expected utility in case of common exposure and information contagion (CE+IC)
places more weight on the two terms in which liquidation may take place (those involving
θ) and a smaller weight on the term without information and liquidation:
EUCE+IC ≡ (qA + qB − qAqB)
[
θu(dβ) + (1− θ)
(
λu(d1) + (1− λ)1
2
[u(cG2 ) + u(dβ)]
)]
+(1− qA)(1− qB)
[
λu(d1) + (1− λ)1
2
(u(cG2 ) + u(c
B
2 ))
]
(3.19)
ACE+IC = (qA + (1− qA)qB)θ (3.20)
which leads to the following result that mirrors lemma 7:
Lemma 8. If information spillovers are unanticipated, then information contagion due
to common exposure unambiguously increases systemic risk:
ACE+IC > ACE (3.21)
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3.3.3 Optimal portfolio choice
We solve for the optimal portfolio choice and the optimal demand deposit payment of
banks at the interim date. A bank faces the following constraints on its choice variables.
The mutual insurance between banks trades oﬀ liquidity insurance with counterparty
risk. It is never optimal to insure more than the maximum amount to compensate for the
regional liquidity demand shock (b∗ ≤ ηd∗1), where stars denote equilibrium allocations.
Furthermore, it is never optimal to face certain costly liquidation, which places a lower
bound on the amount of storage: y∗ + b∗ ≥ λHd∗1 and y∗ − b∗ ≥ λLd∗1. Combined with
the optimal amount of interbank insurance, we obatin a lower bound on storage:
y∗ ≥ y ≡ λHd∗1 − b∗ ≥ λ (3.22)
The interim payment d1 is bounded from above by the available resources and achieves
risk sharing between early and late investors only if it is positive:
0 < d∗1 ≤ min{R,
y∗ + (1− y∗)β + b∗
λH
,
y∗ + (1− y∗)β − b∗
λL
} (3.23)
Our model does not admit a tractable analytical solution for two reasons. First,
corner solutions of the form of no interbank insurance (b∗ = 0) or no investment (y∗ = 1)
are optimal for some parameter values, invalidating interior solutions and calling for a
global approach. Second, solvency thresholds are non-monotonic in several choice vari-
ables. For example, more liquidity is valued when the investment project fails, while less
liquidity is valued when the investment project succeeds. Also , the change in the sol-
vency thresholds with respect to interbank liquidity insurance is in general ambiguous.20
In sum, both corner solutions and the non-monotonicity of the solvency thresholds in
the choice variables confound an analytical solution. However, we determine analytical
solutions for several limiting parameter values in section 3.3.4 to provide intuition for the
mechanics of our model.
We solve the optimization problem numerically. We ﬁnd the global optimum of
20By contrast, more insurance against the idiosyncratic liquidity risk of a investor (higher d1) raises
payments at the interim date at the expense of payments at the final date, thus unambiguously increasing
the solvency threshold. Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) study this trade-off between insurance on a higher
interim payment and higher idiosyncratic financial fragility in a global games setup that allows for non-
essential bank runs.
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the expected utility by discretizing the choice variables (d1, y, b) on a three-dimensional
grid, where the expected utility is evaluated at each grid point. The grid point where
the expected utility takes its global maximum value yields the best response for a given
portfolio choice of the other bank. The intersection of the (symmetric) best response
functions yields the (symmetric) equilibrium allocations. Even though we will incur a
numerical error from discretizing, this error will be small for a suﬃciently ﬁne grid. We
verify the validity of our numerical solution method in section 3.3.4. We compare the
optimal choice variables obtained numerically with the optimal choices in the cases of
limiting parameter values, which admit simple analytical solutions, and obtain negligible
discrepancies only.
We use the following baseline calibration. The period utility function is CRRA,
where ρ > 0 parameterizes the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. Baseline parameter
values are β = 0.7, R = 5.0, φ = 1.0, λ = 0.5, η = 0.25, ρ = 1.0, and qH = qL = 0.7.
Alternative speciﬁcations are considered in appendix 3.8 and in section 3.4.3 that discusses
the variation of each parameter within its feasible bounds. Our results hold across these
various speciﬁcations.
3.3.4 Limiting parameter cases
Our model admits an analytical solution for several limiting parameter values that are
discussed in this section. These cases help us build intuition for the model and serve as
a benchmark for the accuracy of our numerical solution.
First, let the project output in the good state fall short of unity (R ≤ 1). Then,
the investment project is dominated by storage (y∗ = 1). We verify this result across
all benchmark calibrations listed in Appendix 3.8.1 and obtain the numerical solution of
y∗num = 0.98. Second, let investors be risk-neutral (ρ = 0). Then, the project dominates
storage as the former has a higher expected return and investors, who do not mind the
uncertainty about the idiosyncratic liquidity shock, prefer to invest fully in the project
(d∗1 = 0 = y
∗). This result is conﬁrmed numerically (d∗1,num = 0 = y
∗
num). Likewise, if
investors are very risk averse (ρ → ∞), they are not willing to bear any of the invest-
ment risk associated with the project or any liquidity risk. Consequently, no investment
takes place (y∗ = 1) and there is full insurance (d∗1 = 1). In a numerically feasible and
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economically useful implementation we set ρ = 200 and obtain the aﬃrmative results
y∗num = 0.98 and d
∗
1,num = 0.98.
Third, no risk-averse investor (ρ > 0) seeks liquidity insurance in the absence of
regional liquidity shocks (η = 0) for any value of repayment (φ ≥ 0). From an ex-ante
perspective, liquidity insurance in this case is a mean-preserving spread to both interim-
date and ﬁnal-date payoﬀs and is rejected by any risk averse investor. We conﬁrm this
intuition numerically (b∗num = 0). We also consider the related situation of a positive
liquidity shock (η > 0) but no repayment (φ = 0). A risk averse investor would then be
partially insured against this risk b∗ > 0, which is pure ex-ante liquidity insurance. Note
that we require φ > 0 in the baseline calibration and all other calibrations to maintain
a counterparty risk mechanism. Intuitively, the amount of liquidity insurance decreases
in the degree of risk aversion. As investors become more risk averse, they hold more
liquidity as part of the optimal portfolio composition of late investors. The available
liquidity serves as self-insurance against regional liquidity shocks at the interim date and
is a substitute for interbank insurance. For example, a CRRA coeﬃcient of risk aversion
of ρ = 1.0 in the baseline calibration yields b∗num = 0.15, while the same calibration with
ρ = 2.0 yields b∗num = 0.1.
Fourth, if there are no early investors (λ = 0), there is no need for insurance
against idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. The amount of liquidity held fully reﬂects the
optimal portfolio allocation of late investors (0 < y∗ < 1) and increases with the level
of risk aversion (ρ). These predictions are conﬁrmed numerically in the speciﬁcation of
λ = 0.01, where the amount of liquidity ranges from y∗num = 0.42 in a baseline calibration
with ρ = 1.0 to y∗num = 0.74 in the baseline calibration with ρ = 2.0. Likewise, if there are
only early investors (λ = 1) it is optimal not to invest into an asset that only matures at
the ﬁnal date and is costly to liquidate (y∗ = 1). There is no role for liquidity insurance
in this speciﬁcation (b∗ = 0) as there cannot be any liquidity shocks. Since all resources
are used to serve early investors, the optimal interim payment must also be one (d∗1 = 1).
This intuition is conﬁrmed numerically (d∗1,num = 0.99).
Finally, the prior distribution is assumed not to induce liquidation in case of being
uninformed. Hence, no liquidation takes place (θ1 = θ
N
2L = . . . = 0) if investors are never
informed in either region (qA = qB = 0), which is again conﬁrmed numerically.
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3.4 Results
This section summarizes our two main ﬁndings. In subsection 3.4.1 we present a resilience
effect that arises when information contagion occurs due to counterparty risk. In subsec-
tion 3.4.2 we show the existence of an instability effect that emerges when information
contagion occurs due to common exposures. Subsection 3.4.3 provides a global parameter
analysis, verifying the robustness of our two main results across feasible parameter values.
3.4.1 Resilience effect
How does information contagion aﬀect systemic risk stemming from counterparty risk?
We start by considering unanticipated information spillovers similar to the aggregate
liquidity shock in Allen and Gale (2000). In this case the ex-ante optimal portfolio choice
of banks is unaﬀected and systemic risk strictly increases (lemma 7). This result arises
directly from the fact that a failure of the creditor bank becomes more likely after adverse
news about the solvency of the debtor bank. Therefore, information contagion strengthens
the eﬀect of counterparty risk, which leads to a lower level of expected utility and higher
systemic risk. This immediate result is also obtained numerically by comparing entries
in the tables in appendix 3.8.2, notably entry (1,1) for the case of pure counterparty risk
with entry (1,2) for the case of counterparty risk and information contagion, where both
are evaluated at the optimal portfolio choice of the pure counterparty risk case.
The focus of our analysis is on anticipated information contagion. Taking informa-
tion contagion at the interim date into account, banks alter their portfolio choice at the
initial date. Speciﬁcally, a bank makes a more prudent portfolio choice to insure risk-
averse investors against potential information contagion at the interim date. First, banks
reduce the exposure to counterparty risk by engaging in less liquidity co-insurance (lower
b). To cover the liquidity demand from early investors, a bank increases the amount of
storage (larger y), which is akin to liquidity self-insurance. This reduces the investment
in the risky project and funds a larger amount of insurance against idiosyncratic liquidity
risk (larger d1). The more prudent portfolio choices reduces the range of solvency shocks
([θ
N
2L, θ
D
2L]) for which counterparty risk after information contagion occurs. These results
are obtained numerically by comparing the case of pure counterparty risk (entry (1,1))
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with the case of counterparty risk and information contagion (entry (2,2)) in the tables
in appendix 3.8.2.
The crucial insight is that the direct positive eﬀect information contagion on sys-
temic risk (lemma 7) is more than fully compensated by an indirect negative eﬀect via
the change in the ex-ante portfolio choice. Therefore, the overall eﬀect is a reduction in
systemic risk if information contagion is anticipated. We label this the resilience eﬀect
and show in section 3.4.3 that it holds across all feasible parameter values.
Result 1. Consider the setup with counterparty risk (η > 0). Anticipating ex-post in-
formation contagion induces a more prudent portfolio choice ex-ante. More specifically,
liquidity co-insurance, which exposes banks to counterparty risk, is substituted by direct
holdings of liquidity (self-insurance) that reduces the investment in the risky project. The
overall effect is a reduction in both expected utility and systemic risk.
3.4.2 Instability effect
We now analyze how information contagion aﬀects systemic risk in a setup with common
exposures (corr = 1). If information spillover is unanticipated, the optimal portfolio
choice is unaﬀected, implying more systemic risk (lemma 8). Since eﬃcient withdrawals
by investors become more likely after adverse news about the solvency of another bank,
unanticipated information spillover always leads to greater systemic risk.
If information spillovers is anticipated, the bank adjusts its ex-ante optimal portfolio
choice. Speciﬁcally, the optimal interim-date payment is unchanged, while the optimal
liquidity level is slightly lower (within numerical accuracy) across all baseline cases and
feasible parameter choices. However, the changes to the portfolio is small, implying a
small indirect eﬀect on systemic risk only. Therefore, the level of systemic risk increases
overall once information contagion is present. These results are obtained by comparing
the case of pure common exposure (entry (3,3)) with the case of common exposure and
information contagion (entry (4,4)) in the tables in appendix 3.8.2. This eﬀect is again
numerically robust, as demonstrated in section 3.4.3.
Result 2. Consider the setup with common exposures (corr = 1). Then, anticipating
information contagion has a small effect on the portfolio choice at the initial date. As
such, systemic risk and the expected utility increases.
3.4. RESULTS 97
Additional information allows the late investors to decide on early withdrawals in
more states of the world and has two consequences. First, liquidation is optimal for late
investors after a bad solvency shock. Second, liquidation is detrimental to early investors
who only receive their share of the liquidation value and not the (strictly larger) promised
interim payment. Therefore, late investors impose a negative externality on early in-
vestors. Since the level of liquidity in case of common exposures is high to self-insure
against investment risk, the second eﬀect is quantitatively small such that additional
liquidation increases overall expected utility.
3.4.3 Robustness checks
This section shows that the resilience eﬀect and the instability eﬀect are robust to exoge-
nous parameter variations. In particular, we discuss a global variation of parameters by
considering the entire range of feasible parameters and analyse the eﬀect on systemic risk
and expected utility. Details and further analyses, including the optimal portfolio choice
and withdrawal thresholds, are contained in ﬁgures 3.3 - 3.9 in appendix 3.9. Consider
the resilience eﬀect (result 1) ﬁrst. Figure 3.1 displays the expected utility (dotted line)
and systemic risk (dashed line) in the case of counterparty risk and information conta-
gion as a fraction of their respective levels in case of pure counterparty risk. Hence, the
resilience eﬀect is present if relative systemic risk is below unity. We consider parameter
changes of the key variables of the model: the liquidation value (β), the ﬁnal-date return
to the investment project in the good state (R), the proportion of early investors (λ),
and the level of transparency (q). In all cases, the resilience eﬀect prevails.
Turning to the instability eﬀect (result 2), ﬁgure 3.2 displays the expected utility
(dotted line) and systemic risk (dashed line) in the case of common exposure and infor-
mation contagion as a fraction of their respective levels in case of pure common exposure.
Hence, the instability eﬀect is present if the relative systemic risk is above unity. We
consider the same parameter changes again. In all cases, the instability eﬀect prevails.
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Figure 3.1: Robustness checks for the resilience eﬀect (remma 1) consider a variation of
β (top left), R (top right), λ (bottom left), and qH = qL (bottom right). The ﬁgures
display expected utility (dotted line) and the level of systemic risk (dashed line) in the
case of counterparty risk and information contagion as a fraction of their respective levels
in case of pure counterparty risk.
3.5 An application to microfinance
While our model focuses on the systemic risk in the ﬁnancial system of advanced economies,
it is also applicable to the microﬁnance industry prevalent in many emerging countries.
Our model provides a novel theoretical explanation for several ﬁndings in the empiri-
cal microﬁnance literature. In particular, it predicts that (i) group loans have higher
repayment rates than individual loans and (ii) group borrowers hold more liquid assets.
According to the Microcredit Summit Campaign (2012), microﬁnance institutions
(MFIs) served over 205 million customers at the end of 2010, impacting the lives of an
estimated 600 million household members. The growth of the microﬁnance industry is
often attributed to group liability that is designed to overcome problems arising from
asymmetric information (see e.g. Morduch (1999), or Armendáriz and Morduch (2010))
and beneﬁcially transfers risks from the microlender to a group of borrowers (see e.g.
Stiglitz (1990) and Varian (1990)). Group liability refers to an arrangement in which a
lender grants a loan to a group of borrowers that monitor each other and jointly guarantee
3.5. AN APPLICATION TO MICROFINANCE 99
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 1.1
 1.2
 1.3
 1.4
 1.5
 1.6
 0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1
beta
EU[CE+IC]/EU[CE]
A[CE+IC]/A[CE]
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 1.1
 1.2
 1.3
 1.4
 1.5
 1.6
 0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7
lambda
EU[CE+IC]/EU[CR]
A[CE+IC]/A[CE]
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 1.1
 1.2
 1.3
 1.4
 1.5
 1.6
 4  6  8  10  12  14  16  18  20
R
EU[CE+IC]/EU[CE]
A[CE+IC]/A[CE]
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 1.1
 1.2
 1.3
 1.4
 1.5
 1.6
 0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9
qH
EU[CE+IC]/EU[CE]
A[CE+IC]/A[CE]
Figure 3.2: Robustness checks for the instability eﬀect (remma 2) for a variation of β
(top left), R (top right), λ (bottom left), and qH = qL (bottom right). The ﬁgures display
expected utility (dotted line) and the level of systemic risk (dashed line) in the case of
common exposures and information contagion as a fraction of their respective levels in
case of pure common exposures.
loan repayment. Borrowers are typically entrepreneurs from rural areas in developing
countries that cannot pledge collateral.
The essential ingredients of microﬁnance are captured by our model. Due to joint
liability, group lending is characterised by institutionalized counterparty risk. In partic-
ular, each group member guarantees the repayment of the entire loan even if another
group member is unable (or unwilling) to repay, exposing an individual group member to
a large amount of counterparty risk. Furthermore, group members often know each other
well and are in close contact. This implies that news about one group member easily
spreads to other group members, constituting information spillover.21 Finally, the close
proximity of group members gives rise to common exposures such as natural disasters
(e.g. a ﬂood or an earthquake).
The application to microﬁnance can be explicitly translated into our model setup.
21Since it is more costly for banks to acquire this kind of information about the borrowers, monitoring
is delegated to the group and rewarded with lowered interest rates on group loans. See Stiglitz (1990)
and Varian (1990) for a rationalisation of peer monitoring.
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Consider two entrepreneurs k = A,B that jointly wish to take out a group loan from a
microﬁnance institution. Each entrepreneur has access to a safe storage technology (cash
or durable goods) and is oﬀered a risky investment opportunity Rk. This investment
opportunity could be the start of a small local business (e.g. buying an ox to plow a ﬁeld,
or dwelling a well to sell the water) that has a probability to fail. In this interpretation,
a region corresponds most naturally to a sector of the economy. The project pays R with
a regional probability θk and zero with probability (1−θk). An alternative interpretation
is that the investment project will always pay a safe return R but, with some probability
(1 − θk), the entrepreneur has to take this return to cover unexpected expenses such as
an illness of a family member. Liquidation of investment projects is costly due to an
alternative use argument similar to the banking case. In many cases, the MFI is unable
to seize the investment project at all due to its remoteness from the borrower or due to
social pressure (seizing assets from somebody who is already poor). The timeline of our
model applied to microﬁnance is given in table 3.2.
Date 0 Date 1 Date 2
1. Microﬁnance insti- 1. Group loan 1. Investment projects
tution (MFI) decides on institutionalizes mature
group loan counterparty risk
2. Entrepeneurs choose 2. Entrepeneurs observe 2. Group of entrepreneurs
their portfolio regional solvency signals repays MFI
3. Entrepeneurs decide
whether to default
Table 3.2: Timeline of the model applied to microﬁnance
The information structure is equivalent to the banking case. At the interim date,
before the success or failure of the local business projects is determined, entrepreneurs
receive a signal about the regional return of the other entrepreneur in the group.22 Such
a signal can be informative about the business prospects of the group partners or, in the
alternative interpretation with safe investment projects, information about the health of
the family of a group partner. In either case, this signal contains valuable information
since both entrepreneurs are linked via joint liability. In the banking application, we focus
22We take the probability of receiving an informative signal q as being fixed exogenously. An extension
could consider the extent of group member monitoring, modelled by a change in this probability.
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on the impact of ex-post information contagion on ex-ante systemic risk when banks are
subject to counterparty risk. Translated into the microﬁnance setting, we focus on the
impact of ex-post information contagion on the ex-ante default probability of a group
loan.
Strategic default by group members in the microﬁnance application is the equivalent
of withdrawals by late investors in our banking model. Late investors make an eﬃcient
withdrawal decision. Likewise, entrepeneurs decide strategically whether to pay loan
installments (interest and principal) to the MFI. The beneﬁts of default (or diversion of
funds) for an entrepreneur is not to repay his share of the group loan. Another beneﬁt
is not having to pay more upon default by other group members. In the alternative
interpretation with safe investment projects, the beneﬁts of default could be saving the
life of a family member. The cost of default is exclusion from credit via group loans,
foregoing future proﬁts from investment projects. As default increases the burden on
other group members, another cost of default is the possibility of facing hostile group
loan cosigners.23
Similar to banks in our banking application, entrepreneurs decide about the portfo-
lio shares of their funds ex-ante. When entrepeneurs decide between investment in their
project and storage, they consider the possibility of a solvency shock, their business risk,
and its eﬀect on potential future exclusion from credit. The proﬁts from future investment
opportunities induce a precautionary motive for entrepeneurs. Hence, entrepreneurs try
to avoid default by holding more of the safe asset (either cash or durable goods that have
a high liquidation value). In our banking application, banks oﬀer deposit contracts that
may be accepted by investors. Likewise, in the microﬁnance application, entrepreneurs
oﬀer interest payments to a microﬁnance institution.
In the banking application, withdrawing late investors at the debtor bank exert an
externality on late investors at the creditor bank. This correponds to the externality
that one entrepreneur exerts on other members of the group loan when defaulting on
its obligation. When making their ex-ante optimal portfolio choice, banks take this
externality into account by holding more liquidity and this leads to reduced systemic
23There are news reports about large numbers of suicides that were caused by peer pressure after
defaulting on a micro loan (see e.g. BBC News, "India’s micro-finance suicide epidemic", 16 December
2010).
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risk. Translating this resilience effect (Result 1) into the microﬁnance application, our
model predicts that (i) group loans have a higher repayment rate than individual loans
and (ii) group borrowers hold more liquid assets.
The empirical microﬁnance literature supports these predictions. For example,
Giné et al. (2009) constructs a series of "microfinance games" conducted in an urban
market in Peru. They show that loan repayment rates are higher in joint-liability games
(0.88) than in individual-liability games (0.68). Wydick (1999) analyzes group lending
in Guatemala and shows that group repayment rates are determined by the ability to
monitor one another in the presence of asymmetric information. In particular, group
loan repayment rates are higher when group members live in close geographic proximity
or have knowledge about weekly sales of their peers. The resilience eﬀect also implies
that entrepreneurs will hold more liquidity (either in the form of cash or durable goods).
This has been analyzed empirically by Banerjee et al. (2010) who show in a randomized
experiment in India that households with an existing business at the time of the program
invest more in durable goods.
The usefulness of our results for microﬁnance is highlighted by the empirical con-
ﬁrmation of our predictions. This relates to both the ex-ante portfolio choices of en-
trepeneurs and the repayment rates for group loans.
3.6 Conclusion
The aftermath of the Lehmann bankruptcy in September 2008 demonstrated that infor-
mation contagion can be a major source of systemic risk, deﬁned as the probability of
joint bank default. One bank’s investors ﬁnd information about another bank’s solvency
valuable for two reasons. First, both banks might have invested into the same asset class
like risky sovereign debt or mortgage backed securities. Learning about another bank’s
proﬁtability then helps the investor assess the proﬁtability of its bank. Second, one bank
might have lent to the other, for instance as part of a risk-sharing agreement. Learning
about the debtor bank’s proﬁtability then helps investors assess the counterparty risk of
the creditor bank.
This paper presents a model of systemic risk with information contagion. Informa-
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tion about the health of one bank is valuable for the investors of other banks because
of common exposures and counterparty risk. In each case, bad news about one bank
adversely spills over to other banks and causes information contagion. We examine the
eﬀects of ex-post information contagion on the bank’s ex-ante optimal portfolio choice
and the implied level of systemic risk.
We demonstrate that information contagion can reduce systemic risk. When banks
are subject to counterparty risk, investors of one bank may receive a negative signal about
the health of another bank. Given the exposure of the creditor bank to the debtor bank,
adverse information about the debtor bank can cause a run on the creditor bank. Such
information contagion ex-post induces the bank to hold a more prudent portfolio ex-
ante. Banks reduce their exposure to counterparty risk and rely more the self-insurance
of liquidity instead of co-insurance. Overall, the level of systemic risk is reduced once
information contagion is present.
Our model is also applicable to microﬁnance prevalent in many emerging countries.
Group loans with joint liability agreements induce counterparty risk among the group
members. Since group loan borrowers typically have a common bond (e.g. living in the
same village), peer monitoring helps to overcome problems of asymmetric information.
The common bond implies that group members receive information about their peers,
constituting information spillover. We show that counterparty risk and information con-
tagion after adverse news lead to reduced default rates of group loans and increased
holdings of liquid assets by group borrowers because of the eﬀect on the ex-ante port-
folio choices. These predictions are veriﬁed in the empirical literature on microﬁnance,
highlighting the applicability of our model to the microﬁnance setting.
We also show that the eﬀects of information contagion on systemic risk depend on
the source of the revealed information. In case of common exposures, ex-post information
contagion increases systemic risk - similar to Acharya and Yorulmazer (2008a). This leads
to the natural question about the overall eﬀect of information contagion in a model that
features both common exposures and counterparty risk. A unified model of contagion
would be suited to identify the parameter regions characterized by higher (lower) levels
of systemic risk and thus a less (more) stable ﬁnancial system. Such a uniﬁed model of
contagion would also contribute to our understanding of microﬁnance. While allowing
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for information spillover, the close geographic proximity between group lenders implies
that they are subject to common exposures. Analysing joint liability agreements in
the presence of informational spillovers and common exposure is an interesting research
question. However, such a uniﬁed model of contagion is beyond the scope of the present
paper and left for future research.
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3.7 Derivations
3.7.1 Counterparty risk
Start with the debtor region (H). If no signal is received, early investors, of mass λH ,
receive the promised payment d1 and late investors, of mass 1 − λH , receive high and
low payoﬀ, cG2H and c
B
2H , with equal probability. If a signal is received and is below the
threshold θH is received, investors receive a share of the liquidation proceeds and obtain
dH . If a signal above the threshold θH is received, late houesholds obtain a weighted
average of the high and low payoﬀ, where the weights depend on the threshold and early
investors again receive the promised payment.24 Expected utility in the high liquidity
demand region is given as:
EUH = (1− qH)
{
λHu(d1) + (1− λH)
∫ 1
0
[
θu(cG2H) + (1− θ)u(cB2H)
]
dθ
}
(3.24)
+qH
{∫ θH
0
u(dH)dθ +
∫ 1
θH
λHu(d1) + (1− λH)
[
θu(cG2H) + (1− θ)u(cB2H)
]
dθ
}
which yields the expression in the text.
We proceed in the same way for the creditor region (L). The behaviour in the
debtor region determines whether or not the creditor bank is repaid at the ﬁnal date.
This aﬀects both the expected utility from liquidation and the expected utility from
continuation. As the interbank loan is repaid with probability a1H, the expected utility
from liquidation is a1Hu(dDL )+ (1−a1H)u(dNL ). In the informed case, which happens with
probability qL, θL is known. Taking expectations over all possible fundamentals in the
debtor region, the expected utility from continuation is the sum of two terms: (i) with
probability a1H the debtor bank defaults and patient investors at the creditor bank receive
θLu(c
GD
2L ) + (1− θL)u(cBD2L )]; (ii) with probability (1− a1H) the debtor bank survives and
patient investors at the creditor bank receive θLu(cGN2L )+(1−θL)u(cBN2L ) at the ﬁnal date.
The withdrawal threshold is given in equation (3.5) and yields the expected utility of
24Note that in case of no bank run, the weights are equal because of the symmetry of the investent
probabilities θ and 1 − θ when integrated between zero and unity. This symmetry vanishes once the
lower integration bound is above zero.
106 CHAPTER 3. INFORMATION CONTAGION AND SYSTEMIC RISK
investors at the creditor bank to be:
EU1L = (1− qL)
{
λLu(d1) + (1− λL)
∫ 1
0
[
θ
(
aHu(c
GD
2L ) + (1− aH)u(cGN2L )
)
(3.25)
+ (1− θ) (aHu(cBD2L ) + (1− aH)u(cBN2L ))] dθ
}
+qL
{∫ θ1L
0
(
aHu(d
D
L ) + (1− aH)u(dNL )
)
dθ
+
∫ 1
θ1L
λLu(d1) + (1− λL)
[
θ
(
aHu(c
GD
2L ) + (1− aH)u(cGN2L )
)
+(1− θ) (aHu(cBD2L ) + (1− aH)u(cBN2L )) ] dθ
}
which yields the expression in the text.
3.7.2 Common exposures
Turning to expected utility, using the short-hand notation for the continuation payoﬀ:
Γ ≡ λu(d1) + (1− λ)[θuG2 + (1− θ)uB2 ], we ﬁnd:
EUCE ≡ 1− qA + 1− qB
2
∫ 1
0
Γdθ +
qA + qB
2
∫ θ
0
u(dβ)dθ +
qA + qB
2
∫ 1
θ
Γdθ(3.26)
≡ qA + qB
2
[
θu(dβ) + (1− θ)
(
λu(d1) + (1− λ)1
2
[u(cG2 ) + u(dβ)]
)]
+
1− qA + 1− qB
2
[λu(d1) + (1− λ)1
2
(u(cG2 ) + u(c
B
2 ))] (3.27)
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3.8 Tables
Subsection 3.8.1 contains the extreme parameter value benchmarks discussed in subsec-
tion 3.3.4 of the main text for additional baseline cases to show the robustness of our
numerical implementation. Subsection 3.8.2 contains the results of section 3.4 of the main
text.
3.8.1 Extreme parameter value benchmarks
Baseline 1 Baseline 2 Baseline 3 Baseline 4
R = 1.0 y∗ = 0.98 y∗ = 0.98 y∗ = 0.98 y∗ = 0.98
ρ = 0.0 d∗1 = 0.0 d
∗
1 = 0.0 d
∗
1 = 0.0 d
∗
1 = 0.0
y∗ = 0.0 y∗ = 0.0 y∗ = 0.0 y∗ = 0.0
ρ = 200.0 d∗1 = 0.98 d
∗
1 = 0.98 d
∗
1 = 0.98 d
∗
1 = 0.98
y∗ = 0.98 y∗ = 0.98 y∗ = 0.98 y∗ = 0.98
η = 0.0 b∗ = 0.0 b∗ = 0.0 b∗ = 0.0 b∗ = 0.0
φ = 0.0 b∗ = 0.15 b∗ = 0.15 b∗ = 0.15 b∗ = 0.1
λ = 0.01 d∗1 = 1.06 d
∗
1 = 1.0 d
∗
1 = 1.1 d
∗
1 = 1.16
y∗ = 0.42 y∗ = 0.36 y∗ = 0.48 y∗ = 0.74
λ = 0.99 d∗1 = 0.98 d
∗
1 = 0.98 d
∗
1 = 0.98 d
∗
1 = 0.98
y∗ = 0.98 y∗ = 0.98 y∗ = 0.98 y∗ = 0.98
qH = 0.0 A1, . . . , A6 = 0.0 A1, . . . , A6 = 0.0 A1, . . . , A6 = 0.0 A1, . . . , A6 = 0.0
Table 3.3: Extreme parameter values for four baseline cases. Baseline 1: β = 0.7, R = 5.0
φ = 1.0, λ = 0.5, η = 0.25, ρ = 1.0, qH = 0.7. Baseline 2: β = 0.7, R = 5.0 φ = 1.0,
λ = 0.5, η = 0.25, ρ = 0.9, qH = 0.7. Baseline 3: β = 0.7, R = 5.0 φ = 1.0, λ = 0.5,
η = 0.25, ρ = 1.1, qH = 0.7. Baseline 4: β = 0.3, R = 5.0 φ = 1.0, λ = 0.5, η = 0.25,
ρ = 1.1, qH = 0.7.
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3.8.2 Results
cr cr + ic ce ce + ic
(EU , d∗1, y
∗, b∗) (EU , d∗1, y
∗, b∗) (EU , d∗1, y
∗, b∗) (EU , d∗1, y
∗, b∗)
(θH, θ1L , Acr) (θH, θ
N
2L , θ
D
2L, Acr+ic) (θ, Ace) (θ, Ace+ic)
cr (0.172,0.88,0.73,0.08) (0.096,0.88,0.73,0.08)
(0.423,0.23,0.048) (0.423,0.212,0.252,0.052)
cr + (0.107,0.94,0.8,0.02)
ic (0.379,0.211,0.222,0.041)
ce (0.13,1.0,0.77,0.0) (0.137,1.0,0.77,0.0)
(0.328,0.161) (0.328,0.161)
ce + (0.137,1.01,0.76,0.0)
ic (0.344,0.168)
Table 3.4: Equilibrium allocation for diﬀerent forms of ﬁnancial fragility for calibration
β=0.7, R=5.0, φ=1.0, λ=0.5, η=0.25, ρ=1.0, qH=0.7. Expected utility (EU), portfolio
choice variables (d1, y, b), withdrawal thresholds (θH , θ1,L, θ
N
2,L, θ
D
2,L, θ), and systemic ﬁ-
nancial fragility (Acr, Acr+ic, Ace, Ace+ic) in the diﬀerent model variants (cr: counterparty
risk, ic: information contagion, ce: common exposure).
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cr cr + ic ce ce + ic
(EU , d∗1, y
∗, b∗) (EU , d∗1, y
∗, b∗) (EU , d∗1, y
∗, b∗) (EU , d∗1, y
∗, b∗)
(θH, θ1L , Acr) (θH, θ
N
2L , θ
D
2L, Acr+ic) (θ, Ace) (θ, Ace+ic)
cr (0.188,0.86,0.7,0.13) (0.105,0.86,0.7,0.13)
(0.482,0.304,0.072) (0.482,0.278,0.329,0.078)
cr + (0.117,0.93,0.78,0.06)
ic (0.43,0.26,0.283,0.06)
ce (0.142,1.0,0.75,0.0) (0.154,1.0,0.75,0.0)
(0.373,0.183) (0.373,0.183)
ce + (0.158,1.32,0.73,0.0)
ic (0.5,0.245)
Table 3.5: Equilibrium allocation for diﬀerent forms of ﬁnancial fragility for calibration
β=0.9, R=5.0, φ=1.0, λ=0.5, η=0.25, ρ=1.0, qH=0.7. Expected utility (EU), portfolio
choice variables (d1, y, b), withdrawal thresholds (θH , θ1,L, θ
N
2,L, θ
D
2,L, θ), and systemic ﬁ-
nancial fragility (Acr, Acr+ic, Ace, Ace+ic) in the diﬀerent model variants (cr: counterparty
risk, ic: information contagion, ce: common exposure).
110 CHAPTER 3. INFORMATION CONTAGION AND SYSTEMIC RISK
cr cr + ic ce ce + ic
(EU , d∗1, y
∗, b∗) (EU , d∗1, y
∗, b∗) (EU , d∗1, y
∗, b∗) (EU , d∗1, y
∗, b∗)
(θH, θ1L , Acr) (θH, θ
N
2L , θ
D
2L, Acr+ic) (θ, Ace) (θ, Ace+ic)
cr (0.343,0.84,0.69,0.14) (0.221,0.84,0.69,0.14)
(0.372,0.172,0.031) (0.372,0.15,0.206,0.038)
cr + (0.238,0.91,0.77,0.07)
ic (0.318,0.139,0.166,0.026)
ce (0.274,1.0,0.75,0.0) (0.28,1.0,0.75,0.0)
(0.257,0.126) (0.257,0.126)
ce + (0.28,1.01,0.74,0.0)
ic (0.271,0.133)
Table 3.6: Equilibrium allocation for diﬀerent forms of ﬁnancial fragility for calibration
β=0.7, R=10.0, φ=1.0, λ=0.5, η=0.25, ρ=1.0, qH=0.7. Expected utility (EU), portfolio
choice variables (d1, y, b), withdrawal thresholds (θH , θ1,L, θ
N
2,L, θ
D
2,L, θ), and systemic ﬁ-
nancial fragility (Acr, Acr+ic, Ace, Ace+ic) in the diﬀerent model variants (cr: counterparty
risk, ic: information contagion, ce: common exposure).
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cr cr + ic ce ce + ic
(EU , d∗1, y
∗, b∗) (EU , d∗1, y
∗, b∗) (EU , d∗1, y
∗, b∗) (EU , d∗1, y
∗, b∗)
(θH, θ1L , Acr) (θH, θ
N
2L , θ
D
2L, Acr+ic) (θ, Ace) (θ, Ace+ic)
cr (0.262,0.83,0.6,0.07) (0.151,0.83,0.6,0.07)
(0.404,0.258,0.051) (0.404,0.249,0.271,0.054)
cr + (0.166,0.92,0.7,0.01)
ic (0.35,0.231,0.234,0.04)
ce (0.182,1.01,0.68,0.0) (0.192,1.01,0.68,0.0)
(0.313,0.153) (0.313,0.153)
ce + (0.192,1.02,0.66,0.0)
ic (0.327,0.16)
Table 3.7: Equilibrium allocation for diﬀerent forms of ﬁnancial fragility for calibration
β=0.7, R=5.0, φ=1.0, λ=0.3, η=0.25, ρ=1.0, qH=0.7. Expected utility (EU), portfolio
choice variables (d1, y, b), withdrawal thresholds (θH , θ1,L, θ
N
2,L, θ
D
2,L, θ), and systemic ﬁ-
nancial fragility (Acr, Acr+ic, Ace, Ace+ic) in the diﬀerent model variants (cr: counterparty
risk, ic: information contagion, ce: common exposure).
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cr cr + ic ce ce + ic
(EU , d∗1, y
∗, b∗) (EU , d∗1, y
∗, b∗) (EU , d∗1, y
∗, b∗) (EU , d∗1, y
∗, b∗)
(θH, θ1L , Acr) (θH, θ
N
2L , θ
D
2L, Acr+ic) (θ, Ace) (θ, Ace+ic)
cr (0.232,0.82,0.69,0.0) (0.071,0.82,0.69,0.0)
(0.36,0.236,0.014) (0.36,0.236,0.236,0.014)
cr + (0.099,0.94,0.82,0.0)
ic (0.331,0.207,0.207,0.011)
ce (0.121,1.0,0.79,0.0) (0.128,1.0,0.79,0.0)
(0.313,0.05) (0.313,0.05)
ce + (0.128,1.0,0.78,0.0)
ic (0.321,0.051)
Table 3.8: Equilibrium allocation for diﬀerent forms of ﬁnancial fragility for calibration
β=0.7, R=5.0, φ=1.0, λ=0.5, η=0.25, ρ=1.0, qH=0.4. Expected utility (EU), portfolio
choice variables (d1, y, b), withdrawal thresholds (θH , θ1,L, θ
N
2,L, θ
D
2,L, θ), and systemic ﬁ-
nancial fragility (Acr, Acr+ic, Ace, Ace+ic) in the diﬀerent model variants (cr: counterparty
risk, ic: information contagion, ce: common exposure).
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3.9 Details for robustness checks
This section provides further details about the robustness checks performed in subsection
3.4.3. In particular, we show the evolution of the portfolio choice variables and withdrawal
thresholds when varying the exogenous parameters of the model.
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Figure 3.3: Details of portfolio choice: d1, y (top), b and θH (middle), and various θL
values for a variation of β. The baseline calibration is used for the non-varying parameters.
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Figure 3.4: Details of portfolio choice: d1, y (top), b and θH (middle), and various
θL values for a variation of R. The baseline calibration is used for the non-varying
parameters.
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Figure 3.5: Details of portfolio choice: d1, y (top), b and θH (middle), and various θL
values for a variation of φ. The baseline calibration is used for the non-varying parameters.
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Figure 3.6: Details of portfolio choice: d1, y (top), b and θH (middle), and various θL
values for a variation of λ. The baseline calibration is used for the non-varying parameters.
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Figure 3.7: Details of portfolio choice: d1, y (top), b and θH (middle), and various θL
values for a variation of η. The baseline calibration is used for the non-varying parameters.
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Figure 3.8: Details of portfolio choice: d1, y (top), b and θH (middle), and various θL
values for a variation of ρ. The baseline calibration is used for the non-varying parameters.
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Figure 3.9: Details of portfolio choice: d1, y (top), b and θH (middle), and various
θL values for a variation of qH . The baseline calibration is used for the non-varying
parameters.
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